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Abstract
We study complete approximations of an ontology
formulated in a non-Horn description logic (DL)
such as ALC in a Horn DL such as EL. We provide
concrete approximation schemes that are necessar-
ily infinite and observe that in the ELU -to-EL case
finite approximations tend to exist in practice and
are guaranteed to exist when the source ontology
is acyclic. In contrast, neither of these are the case
for ELU⊥-to-EL⊥ and for ALC-to-EL⊥ approxi-
mations. We also define a notion of approximation
tailored towards ontology-mediated querying, con-
nect it to subsumption-based approximations, and
identify a case where finite approximations are guar-
anteed to exist.
1 Introduction
Despite prominent standardization efforts such as OWL, a
large variety of description logics (DLs) continues to be used
as ontology languages. In fact, ontology designers choose a
DL suitable for their purposes based on many factors including
expressive power, computational properties, and tool support
[Baader et al., 2017]. Since ontology engineering frequently
involves (partial) reuse of existing ontologies, this raises the
problem of converting an ontology written in some source
DL LS into a desired target DL LT . A particularly important
case is ontology approximation where LT is a fragment of
LS , studied for example in [Pan and Thomas, 2007; Ren et
al., 2010; Botoeva et al., 2010; Carral et al., 2014; Zhou et al.,
2015; Bo¨tcher et al., 2019].
In practice, ontology approximation is often done in an ad
hoc way by dropping all statements from the source ontology
OS that are not expressible in LT , or at least the inexpressible
parts of such statements. It is well-known that this results in
incomplete approximations, that is, there will be knowledge
in OS that could be expressed in LT , but is not contained in
the resulting approximated ontology. The degree and nature
of the resulting incompleteness is typically neither understood
nor analyzed. One reason for this unsatisfactory situation
might be the fact that it is by no means easy to construct
complete approximations and, even worse, finite complete
approximations are not guaranteed to exist. This was studied
in depth in [Bo¨tcher et al., 2019] where ontologies formulated
in expressive Horn DLs such as Horn-SHIF and ELI are
approximated in tractable Horn DLs such as EL. For example,
it is shown there that finite complete ELI-to-EL approxima-
tions do not exist even in extremely simple cases including
those occurring in practice. The authors then lay out a new
research program for ontology approximation that consists
in mapping out the structure of complete (infinite) ontology
approximations as a tool for guiding informed decisions when
constructing incomplete (finite) approximations in practice,
and also to enable a better understanding of the degree and
nature of incompleteness.
In this paper, we consider LS-to-LT ontology approxima-
tion where LS is a non-Horn DL such as ALC and LT is a
tractable Horn DL such as EL. Arguably, these are extremely
natural cases of ontology approximation given that Horn vs.
non-Horn is nowadays the most important classification crite-
rion for DLs [Baader et al., 2017]. Non-Horn DLs include ex-
pressive features such as negation and disjunction and require
‘reasoning by cases’ which is computationally costly, but also
have considerably higher expressive power than Horn DLs.
Horn DLs, in contrast, enjoy favourable properties such as
the existence of universal models and of ‘consequence-based’
reasoning algorithms that avoid reasoning by cases [Cucala et
al., 2019]. Despite being natural, however, non-Horn-to-Horn
approximation turns out to be a challenging endeavour.
We start with the fundamental case of ELU -to-EL approxi-
mation. Given an ELU ontology OS , we aim to find a (poten-
tially infinite) EL ontology OT such that for all EL concepts
C,D in the signature ofOS ,OS |= C v D iffOT |= C v D.
Example 1. Consider the ELU ontology
OS = { Job v MainJob unionsq SideJob
∃job.SideJob v ∃job.(MainJob u PartTime) }.
Then the following is an EL approximation of OS:
OT = { ∃job.SideJob v ∃job.(MainJob u PartTime)
∃job.Job v ∃job.MainJob
∃job.(Job u PartTime) v ∃job.(MainJob u PartTime) }.
The last two lines of OT illustrate that EL consequences of
ELU ontologies can be rather non-obvious.
We first prove that finite approximations need not exist in
the ELU-to-EL case and that depth bounded approximations
may be non-elementary in size. Our main result is then a con-
crete approximation scheme that makes explicit the structure
of complete infinite approximations and aims to keep as much
structure of the source ontology as possible. An interesting
and, given the results in [Bo¨tcher et al., 2019], surprising
feature of our scheme is that it can be expected to often de-
liver finite approximations in practical cases. We perform a
case study based on the Manchester ontology corpus that con-
firm this expectation. We also show that if OS is an acyclic
ELU ontology, then a finite EL approximation always exists
(though it need not be acyclic). The finite approximations
that we obtain are too large to be directly used in practice.
Nevertheless, we view our results as positive and believe that
in practice approximations of reasonable size often exist, as in
Example 1. A ‘push button technology’ for constructing them,
however, is outside of the scope of this paper.
We then proceed to the cases of ELU⊥-to-EL⊥ and ALC-
to-EL⊥ approximations which turn out to be closely related
to each other. They also turn out to be significantly different
from the ELU-to-EL case in that finite approximations do
not exist in extremely simple (and practical) cases, much like
in the Horn approximation cases studied in [Bo¨tcher et al.,
2019]. Also, finite approximations of acyclic ontologies are
no longer guaranteed to exist. While this is not good news,
it is remarkable that the addition of the ⊥ symbol has such a
dramatic effect. We again provide an (infinite) approximation
scheme.
Finally, we propose a notion of approximation that is tai-
lored towards applications in ontology-mediated querying
[Calvanese et al., 2009] and show that it is intimately related
to the subsumption-based approximations that we had stud-
ied before. Remarkably, if we concentrate on atomic queries
(AQs), then we obtain finite approximations even in the ALC-
to-EL⊥ case. Compared to the related work presented in
[Kaminski et al., 2016], we do not require the preservation of
all query answers, but only of a maximal subset thereof, and
our method is applicable to all ontologies formulated in the
source DL chosen rather than to a syntactically restricted class.
We also observe an interesting application to the rewritability
of ontology-mediated queries.
All proofs are deferred to the appendix [Haga et al., 2020].
2 Preliminaries
Let NC and NR be disjoint and countably infinite sets of con-
cept names and role names. In the description logic ALC,
concepts C,D are built according to the syntax rule
C,D ::= > | ⊥ | A | ¬C | C uD | C unionsqD | ∃r.C | ∀r.C
where A ranges over NC and r over NR. The depth of a
concept is the nesting depth of the constructors ∃r and ∀r in it.
For example, the concept ∃r.B u ∃r.∃s.A is of depth 2. We
introduce other DLs as fragments ofALC. An ELU⊥ concept
is an ALC concept that does not contain negations ¬C and
value restrictions ∀r.C. An EL⊥ concept is an ELU⊥ concept
that does not contain disjunctions C unionsqD. ELU concepts and
EL concepts are defined likewise, but additionally forbid the
use of the bottom concept ⊥.
For any of these DLs L, an L ontology is a set of concept in-
clusions (CIs) C v D where C and D are L concepts. While
ontologies used in practice have to be finite, we frequently con-
sider also infinite ontologies. W.l.o.g., we assume that all oc-
currences of⊥ in ELU⊥ ontologies are in CIs of the formC v
⊥, where C does not contain⊥. An acyclic ontologyO is a set
of concept inclusions A v C and concept equivalences A ≡
C whereA is a concept name (that is, it is not a compound con-
cept), the left-hand sides are unique, and O does not contain
a definitiorial cycle A0 ./1 C0, . . . , An ./n Cn, ./i∈ {v,≡},
where Ci contains Ai+1 modn+1 for all i ≤ n. An equivalence
A ≡ C can be viewed as two CIs A v C and C v A and thus
every acyclic ontology is an ontology in the original sense.
A signature Σ is a set of concept and role names, uniformly
referred to as symbols. We use sig(X) to denote the set of
symbols used in any syntactic object X such as a concept or
an ontology. If sig(X) ⊆ Σ, we also say that X is over Σ.
The size of a (finite) syntactic object X , denoted ||X||, is the
number of symbols needed to write it, with every occurrence
of a concept and role name contributing one.
The semantics of concepts and ontologies is defined in terms
of interpretations I = (∆I , ·I) as usual, see [Baader et al.,
2017]. An interpretation I satisfies a CI C v D if CI ⊆ DI ,
an equivalence A ≡ C if AI = CI , and it is a model of an
ontology O if it satisfies all CIs in O. Concept C is subsumed
by concept D w.r.t. ontologyO, writtenO |= C v D, if every
model I of O satisfies the CI C v D; we then also say that
the CI is a consequence of O. Subsumption can be decided in
polynomial time in EL⊥ and is EXPTIME-complete between
ELU and ALC [Baader et al., 2017]. We now give our main
definition of approximation. With concept of depth bounded
by ω, we mean concepts of unrestricted depth.
Definition 1. Let OS be an ALC ontology, sig(OS) = Σ,
LT any of the DLs introduced above, and ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}. A
(potentially infinite) LT ontology OT is an `-bounded LT
approximation of OS if
OS |= C v D iff OT |= C v D
for all LT concepts C,D over Σ of depth bounded by `. OT is
non-projective if sig(OT ) ⊆ Σ and projective otherwise. We
refer to ω-bounded LT approximations as LT approximations.
We refer to the “if” direction of the biimplication in Defi-
nition 1 as soundness of the approximation and to the “only
if” direction as completeness. Infinite approximations always
exist: take as OT the set of all L CIs C v D with C,D over
Σ and OS |= C v D. In the same way, finite (non-projective)
depth-bounded approximations always exist. With LS-to-LT
approximation, LS a DL and LT a fragment of LS , we mean
the task to approximate an LS ontology in LT , possibly using
an infinite ontology.
3 ELU-to-EL Approximation
We consider ELU-to-EL approximation as the simplest case
of approximating non-Horn ontologies in a Horn DL.
Fundamentals. We start with observing that projective
approximations are more powerful than non-projective ones.
Proposition 1. The ELU ontology
OS = { A v B1 unionsqB2,
∃r.Bi v Bi, for i ∈ {1, 2}
Bi uA′ v M for i ∈ {1, 2} }.
C v XC
XD1 u C v XD2 if OS |= D1 u C v D2
XD1 uXD2 v XD3 if OS |= D1 uD2 v D3
∃r.XD1 v XD2 if OS |= ∃r.D1 v D2
XD1 v ∃r.XD2 if OS |= D1 v ∃r.D2
XD1 v C if OS |= D1 v C
Figure 1: Candidate EL approximation OT .
has a finite projective EL approximation, but every non-
projective EL approximation is infinite.
In fact, a finite projective EL approximation OT of the
ontology OS from Proposition 1 is obtained from OS by re-
placing the CI in the first line with
A v XB1unionsqB2 , ∃r.XB1unionsqB2 v XB1unionsqB2 , XB1unionsqB2 uA′ vM.
The intuitive reason for why OS has no finite non-projective
EL approximation is that OS |= A′ u ∃rn.A v M for all
n ≥ 0. Proposition 1 indicates that projective approximations
are preferable. Since they also seem perfectly acceptable from
an application viewpoint, we concentrate on the projective case
and from now on mean projective approximations whenever
we speak of approximations.
To illustrate the challenges of ELU-to-EL approximation,
it is instructive to consider a candidate approximation scheme
that might be suggested by Proposition 1. We use sub(OS)
to denote the set of all subconcepts of (concepts in) the ontol-
ogy OS and sub−(OS) to denote the restriction of sub(OS)
to concept names and existential restrictions ∃r.C. We use
Con(OS) to denote the set of all non-empty conjunctions of
concepts from sub−(OS) without repetitions and Dis(OS)
to mean the set of all disjunctions of concepts from Con(OS)
without repetitions. Now, a (finite projective) candidate EL
approximation scheme is given in Figure 1 where C ranges
over sub(OS) and D1, D2, D3 range over Dis(OS). It in-
deed yields an approximation when applied to the ontology
OS in Proposition 1. There are, however, two major problems.
First, the syntactic structure of OS is lost completely, which
is undesirable in practice where ontologies are the result of
a careful modeling effort. We could include all EL concept
inclusions from OS in the approximation, but this would be
purely cosmetic since all such CIs are already implied. Sec-
ond, the approximation is incomplete in general. In fact, finite
approximations need not exist also in the projective case while
the approximation scheme in Figure 1 is always finite.
Proposition 2. The ELU ontology
OS = { A v B1 unionsqB2,
∃r.B2 v ∃r.(B1 u L),
L v ∃s.L }
has no finite EL approximation.
The intuitive reason for why OS has no finite EL approxi-
mation is thatOS |= ∃r.(Au∃sn.>) v ∃r.(B1 u∃sn.>) for
all n ≥ 0.
The ontology in Proposition 2 can be varied to show that
even bounded depth approximations can get very large. The
function tower : N×N→ N is defined as tower(0, n) := n
and tower(k + 1, n) := 2tower(k,n).
C v DNF(E)↑ if C v E ∈ OS
XD uD↑1 v D↑2 if OS |= D uD1 v D2
∃r.XD v D↑1 if OS |= ∃r.D v D1
F ↑ v ∃r.G if OS |= F v ∃r.G
where in the last line
• F is an EL concept over sig(OS) decorated with dis-
junctions from Dis(OS) at leaves and
• G is an OS-generatable EL concept over sig(OS)
such that depth(F ) ≤ depth(G) < `.
Figure 2: `-bounded EL approximation O`T .
Proposition 3. Let OnS be obtained from the ontology OS in
Proposition 2 by replacing the bottommost CI with
L v A1 u Aˆ1 u · · · uAn u Aˆn u ∃r1.L u ∃r2.L
Then for all n, ` ≥ 1 and any `-bounded EL approximation
OT of OnS , ||OT || ≥ tower(`, n).
A Complete Approximation. We present a more care-
ful approximation scheme that aims to preserve the struc-
ture of OS , is complete, and yields a finite approximation
in many practical cases. Let OS be an ELU ontology to be
approximated. As a preliminary, we assume that for all CIs
C v D ∈ OS , C is an EL concept. If this is not the case,
then we can rewrite OS by exhaustively replacing every dis-
junction C unionsqD that occurs (possibly as a subconcept) on the
left-hand side of a concept inclusion in OS with a fresh con-
cept name XCunionsqD and adding the inclusions C v XCunionsqD and
D v XCunionsqD. It is not hard to see that the resulting ontology
O′S is of size polynomial in ||OS || and a conservative exten-
sion of OS in the sense that OS |= C v D iff O′S |= C v D
for all ELU concepts C,D over sig(OS). Consequently,
every EL approximation ofO′S is also a projective EL approx-
imation of OS and we can work with O′S in place of OS .
Let ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}. The proposed EL approximation O`T ofOS is given in Figure 2 where D1, D2 range over Dis(OS)
and D ranges over Dis−(OS), the set of all disjunctions in
Dis(OS) that have at least two disjuncts. We still have to
define the notation and terminology used in the figure. For
an ELU concept C such that all disjunctions in C are from
Dis(OS), we use C↑ to denote the EL concept obtained from
C by replacing every outermost D ∈ Dis−(OS) with a fresh
concept name XD. Set DNF(C) = C if C is a concept name or
of the form ∃r.D, DNF(C1 uC2) = DNF(C1) u DNF(C2), and
define DNF(C1 unionsq C2) to be the ELU -concept obtained by con-
verting C1 unionsq C2 into disjunctive normal form (DNF), treating
existential restrictions ∃r.D as atomic concepts, that is, the
argument D is not modified. Note that while ||DNF(C)|| may
be exponential in ||C||, we have ||DNF(C)↑|| ≤ ||C||. By dec-
orating an EL concept C with disjunctions from Dis(OS) at
leaves, we mean to replace subconcepts ∃r.E of C with E of
depth 0 by ∃r.(E uD), D ∈ Dis(OS). As a special case, we
can replace C with C uD, D ∈ Dis(OS), if C is of depth 0.
Definition 2. An EL concept C is OS-generatable if there is
an ∃r.D ∈ sub(OS) that occurs on the right-hand side of a
CI in OS and satisfies OS |= D v C.
Let us explain the proposed approximation. The first three
lines of Figure 2 can be viewed as a more careful version of
the first four lines of Figure 1. In the first line, we preserve
the structure of OS as long as it lies outside the scope of a dis-
junction operator, thanks to the careful definition of DNF(C).
This is not cosmetic as in the candidate approximation in Fig-
ure 1: since we introduce the concept names XD only when
a disjunction is ‘derived’ (first line) and only for disjunctions
D ∈ Dis−(OS), O`T is no longer guaranteed to be an approx-
imation when the first line in Figure 2 is dropped. The last
line of the approximation addresses the effect illustrated by
Proposition 2. It is strong enough so that a counterpart of
the second last line in Figure 1 is not needed. An example
application of our approximation scheme is given in [Haga et
al., 2020].
An interesting aspect of our approximation is that it turns
out to be finite in many practical cases. In fact, it is easy to
see that O`T is finite for all ` < ω and that OωT is finite if
and only if there are only finitely many EL concepts that are
OS-generatable, up to logical equivalence; we then say that
OS is finitely generating. Since ontologies from practice tend
to have a simple structure, one might expect that they often
enjoy this property. Below, we report about a case study that
confirms this expectation.
How does the approximation scheme in Figure 2 relate to
the examples given above? For the ontologies OS in Exam-
ple 1 and in Proposition 1, our approximation OωT contains
all CIs in the approximation OT given in place. Of course,
OωT also contains a lot of additional CIs that, however, do
not result in any new consequences C v D with C,D EL
concepts over sig(OS). It seems very difficult to identify up
front those CIs that are really needed. We can remove them
after constructing OωT by repeatedly deciding conservative ex-
tensions [Lutz and Wolter, 2010], but this is not practical given
the size of OωT . Nevertheless, both ontologies OS are finitely
generating and thus in both cases OωT is finite. In Example 1,
theOS-generatable concepts are>, MainJob, PartTime, and
MainJob u PartTime (up to logical equivalence) while there
are no OS-generatable concepts for Proposition 1. For Propo-
sition 2, there are infinitely many OS-generatable concepts
such as ∃sn.> for all n ≥ 0.
Case Study. We have considered the seven non-trivial ELU
ontologies that are part of the Manchester OWL corpus.1 The
size of the ontologies ranges from 113 to 813 concept inclu-
sions and equalities. All ontologies use disjunction on the
right-hand side of CIs (thus in a non-trivial way) and none
of them is acyclic. We have been able to prove that all these
ontologies are finitely generating and thus the approximation
OωT is finite. Our proof relies on the following observation.
Lemma 1. OS is not finitely generating iff for every n ≥ 0,
there is an ∃r.D ∈ sub(OS) that occurs on the right-hand
side of a CI and a sequence r1, . . . , rn of role names from OS
such that OS |= D v ∃r1. · · · .∃rn.>.
In our implementation, we use role inclusions to avoid going
through all of the exponentially many sequences r1, . . . , rn.
Lemma 1 can also be used to show the following.
1http://owl.cs.manchester.ac.uk/publications/supporting-
material/owlcorpus/
Theorem 1. It is decidable whether a given ELU-ontology
OS is finitely generating.
By what was said above, this implies that it is decidable
whether the approximation OωT from Figure 2 is finite.
Soundness and Completeness. We now establish sound-
ness and completeness of the proposed approximation, the
main result in this section.
Theorem 2. For every ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}, O`T is an `-bounded EL
approximation of OS .
While soundness is easy to show, completeness is remark-
ably subtle to prove. It is stated by the following lemma which
shows that our approximation O`T is actually stronger than
required in that it preserves all EL subsumptions C v D with
D of depth bounded by ` and C of unrestricted depth.
Lemma 2. Let ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}. Then OS |= C0 v D0 implies
O`T |= C0 v D0 for all EL concepts C0, D0 over sig(OS)
such that the role depth of D0 is bounded by `.
The proof of Lemma 2 is the most substantial one in this
paper. It uses a chase procedure for ELU ontologies that is
specifically tailored towards proving completeness in that it is
deterministic rather than disjunctive and mimics the concept
inclusions in Figure 2. Showing that this chase is complete is
far from trivial.
Fewer Symbols. The number of fresh concept names XD
in O`T is double exponential in ||OS || since the number of dis-
junctions in Dis−(O) is. However, O`T can be rewritten into
an ontology Ô`T that uses only single exponentially many fresh
concept names and is still an `-bounded approximation of OS .
The idea is to transition from disjunctive normal form to con-
junctive normal form, that is, to replace each concept name
XD, D ∈ Dis−(O), with a conjunction of concept names
YD′ where D′ is a disjunction of concepts from sub−(O),
rather than conjunctions thereof. Details are in [Haga et al.,
2020].
Theorem 3. For every ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}, Ô`T is an `-bounded EL
approximation of OS .
Acyclic Ontologies. Using Lemma 1, one can show that
OωT is finite whenever OS is an acyclic ELU ontology. In fact,
the length n of role sequences with the properties stated in the
lemma is bounded by ||OS || if OS is acyclic.
Theorem 4. Every acyclic ELU ontology has a finite EL
approximation.
There is, however, more that we can say about acyclic on-
tologies. We first observe that there are acyclic ELU ontolo-
gies that have finite EL approximations, but no EL approxi-
mation that is an acyclic ontology.
Example 2. Consider the acyclic ELU ontology
OS = {A ≡ (B1 uB2) unionsq (B1 uB3)}.
Then OT = {B1 u B2 v A,B1 u B3 v A,A v B1} is an
EL approximation of OS , but OS has no EL approximation
that is an acyclic ontology, finite or infinite.
Further, our approximations O`T can be simplified for
acyclic ELU ontologies OS . Let O˜`T be defined like O`T
in Figure 2, except that in the last line, F ranges only over
concept names (not decorated with disjunctions) rather than
over compound concepts, a significant simplification.
Theorem 5. Let ` ∈ N ∪ {ω} and let OS be an acyclic ELU
ontology. Then O˜`T is an `-bounded EL approximation of OS .
Based on this observation, constructing finite EL approxi-
mations of acyclic ELU ontologies does not seem infeasible
in practice.
4 ALC-to-EL⊥ Approximation
We consider ELU⊥-to-EL⊥ and ALC-to-EL⊥ approximation
which turn out to be closely related to each other and signifi-
cantly different from ELU-to-EL approximation.
It immediately follows from the results in Section 3 that
finite approximations are guaranteed to exist neither in the
ELU⊥-to-EL⊥ nor in the ALC-to-EL⊥ case. However, while
we have argued that finite ELU-to-EL approximations can
be expected to exist in many practical cases, this does not
appear to be true for ELU⊥-to-EL⊥ and ALC-to-EL⊥. The
following example illustrates the problem.
Example 3. Consider the ELU⊥ ontology
OS = { A1 vM unionsqN1,
A2 vM unionsqN2,
∃r.N1 u ∃r.N2 v ⊥ }.
There are no OS-generatable EL concepts. Yet, there is no
finite EL⊥ approximation of OS . Informally, this is because
OS |= ∃r.(A1u∃rn.>)u∃r.(A2u∃rn.>) v ∃r.(Mu∃rn.>)
for all n ≥ 1.2
While the above example is for ELU⊥-to-EL⊥, there is an
additional effect in ALC-to-EL⊥ that already occurs for very
simple ontologies OS .
Example 4. The ALC ontology OS = {A v ∀r.B} has
no finite EL⊥ approximation. This is shown in [Bo¨tcher et
al., 2019] for the equivalent ELI ontology {∃r−.A v B}.
Informally, this is because OS |= A u ∃rn+1.> v ∃r.(B u
∃rn.>) for all n ≥ 1.
Note that the ontology OS in Example 4 is acyclic and thus
in contrast to the ELU -to-EL case, finite EL⊥ approximations
of acyclic ALC ontologies need not exist. In a sense, Exam-
ple 3 shows the same negative result for the ELU⊥-to-EL⊥
case. While the ontology used there is not strictly acyclic,
acyclic ontologies do not make much sense in the case of
ELU⊥ and additionally admitting CIs C1 u C2 v ⊥ as used
in Example 3 seems to be the most modest extension possible
that incorporates ⊥ in a meaningful way.
Despite these additional challenges, we can extend the ap-
proximation given in Section 3 to ELU⊥-to-EL⊥ and to ALC-
to-EL⊥ when we are willing to dropOS-generatability and, as
a consequence, accept the fact that approximations are infinite
unless they are depth bounded. Note that the latter is also the
case in L-to-EL approximation where L is an expressive Horn
DL such as ELI [Bo¨tcher et al., 2019].
2A formal proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2.
C v DNF(E)↑ if C v E ∈ OS
XD uD↑1 v D↑2 if OS |= D uD1 v D2
∃r.XD v D↑1 if OS |= ∃r.D v D1
F ↑ v ∃r.G if OS |= F v ∃r.G
where in the last line F is an EL concept over sig(OS)
decorated with disjunctions from Dis(OS) at leaves and G
is an EL concept over sig(OS) such that
1. F has no top-level conjunct ∃r.F ′ s.t. OS |= F ′ v G;
2. depth(F ) ≤ depth(G) < `.
Figure 3: `-bounded EL⊥ approximation O`T .
We first reduce ALC-to-EL⊥ approximations to ELU⊥-to-
EL⊥ approximations. Let OS be an ALC ontology. We can
transform OS into an ELU⊥ ontology as follows:
1. replace each subconcept ∀r.C with ¬∃r.¬C;
2. select a concept ¬C such that C contains no negation,
replace all occurrences of ¬C with the fresh concept
name A¬C , and add the CIs > v C unionsq A¬C and C u
A¬C v ⊥; repeat until no longer possible.
The resulting ontology O′S is of size polynomial in ||OS ||
and a conservative extension of OS in the sense that OS |=
C v D iff O′S |= C v D for all ALC concepts C,D over
sig(OS). Consequently, every EL⊥ approximation of O′S is
also a (projective) EL⊥ approximation of OS .
It thus suffices to consider ELU⊥-to-EL⊥ approximations.
Thus let OS be an ELU⊥ ontology. For each ` ∈ N ∪ {ω},
the EL⊥ approximation O`T of OS is given in Figure 2
where again D ranges over Dis−(OS) and D1, D2 range over
Dis(OS); both Dis(OS) and Dis−(OS) are defined exactly
as for ELU ontologies and in DNF(C) we drop all disjuncts
that contain ⊥ as a conjunct, possibly resulting in the empty
disjunction (which represents ⊥). Point 1 can be viewed as
an optimization that sometimes helps to avoid the expensive
last line. There, a top-level conjunct means a concept Fi if F
takes the form F1 u · · · u Fn, n ≥ 1. In [Haga et al., 2020],
we point out another non-trivial such optimization.
Theorem 6. O`T is an `-bounded EL⊥ approximation of OS .
The proof of Theorems 2 and 6 also establishes another
result that will turn out to be interesting in the context of
ontology-mediated queries in Section 5. We use O−T to denote
the restriction of OωT to the (instantiations) of the first three
lines in Figure 3 (equivalently: Figure 2). Clearly, O−T is
always finite.
Theorem 7. Let C0, D0 be EL⊥ concepts with D0 ∈
sub(OS). Then OS |= C0 v D0 iff O−T |= C0 v D0.
5 Approximations and Query Evaluation
The notion of approximations given in Section 2 is tailored to-
wards preserving subsumptions. In ontology-mediated query-
ing, in contrast, the main aim of approximation is to preserve
as many query answers as possible. We propose a suitable
notion of approximation and show that the results obtained
in the previous sections have interesting applications also in
ontology-mediated querying.
Let NI be a countably infinite set of individual names dis-
joint from NC and NR. An ABox is a finite set of concept
assertions A(a) and role assertions r(a, b) where A ∈ NC,
r ∈ NR, and a, b ∈ NI. We use Ind(A) to denote the set of
individual names in the ABox A. An interpretation I satis-
fies a concept assertion A(a) if a ∈ AI and a role assertion
r(a, b) if (a, b) ∈ rI . It is a model of an ABox if it satisfies all
assertions in it. A Σ-ABox is an ABox A with sig(A) = Σ.
An ontology-mediated query (OMQ) is a triple Q =
(O,Σ, q) with O an ontology, Σ an ABox signature, and q
an actual query. While conjunctive queries (CQs) and unions
of CQs are a popular choice for formulating q and our central
Definition 3 below makes sense also for these richer query lan-
guages, for simplicity we concentrate on atomic queries (AQs)
A(x) where A is a concept name and on EL queries (ELQs)
C(x) where C an EL concept. We also mention ALC queries
(ALCQs) C(x) where C is anALC concept. Note that all such
queries are unary. We use ELQ(Σ) to denote the language of
all ELQs that use only symbols from signature Σ. Let (L,Q)
denote the OMQ language that contains all OMQs Q in which
O is formulated in DL L and q in query language Q, such as
in (EL,AQ).
Let Q = (O,Σ, C(x)) be an OMQ andA a Σ-ABox. Then
a ∈ Ind(A) is an answer to Q on A, written A |= Q(a), if
a ∈ CI for all models I of O and A. For OMQs Q1 and
Q2, Qi = (Oi,Σ, qi), we say that Q1 is contained in Q2
and write Q1 ⊆ Q2 if for every Σ-ABox A and a ∈ Ind(A),
A |= Q1(a) impliesA |= Q2(a). We say thatQ1 is equivalent
to Q2 and write Q1 ≡ Q2 if Q1 ⊆ Q2 and Q2 ⊆ Q1.
A natural definition of ontology approximation in the con-
text of OMQs is as follows.
Definition 3. LetOS be anALC ontology, LT one of the DLs
from Section 2, and Q a query language. An LT ontology OT
is an LT approximation of OS w.r.tQ if for all queries q ∈ Q
and all signatures Σ with Σ ∩ sig(OT ) ⊆ sig(OS),
1. (OS ,Σ, q) ⊇ (OT ,Σ, q) and
2. (OS ,Σ, q) ⊇ Q implies (OT ,Σ, q) ⊇ Q for all OMQs
Q = (O′T ,Σ, q) ∈ (LT ,Q).
OT might use fresh symbols and thus approximations are
projective. Informally, Point 1 is a soundness condition and
Point 2 formalizes ‘to preserve as many query answers as
possible’. It is not guaranteed that the OMQs (OS ,Σ, q) and
(OT ,Σ, q) are equivalent for all relevant queries q and signa-
tures Σ, and the following example shows that this is in fact
impossible to achieve. However, Point 2 of Definition 3 en-
sures that (OT ,Σ, q) is the best approximation of (OS ,Σ, q)
from below among all OMQs from (LT ,Q).
Example 5. Let OS be the ELU ontology
OS = {> v B1 unionsqB2} ∪ {Bi u ∃r.Bi v A | i ∈ {1, 2}}
Then an EL approximation of OS w.r.t. ELQ is
OT = {B1 uB2 u ∃r.> v A, ∃r.(B1 uB2) v A}
∪ {Bi u ∃r.Bi v A | i ∈ {1, 2}}.
However, there is no OMQ in (EL,ELQ) that is equivalent to
(OS , {r}, A(x)) since it would have to return a as an answer
on the ABox {r(a, a)}, but not on the ABox {r(a, b), r(b, a)}.
No OMQ from (EL,ELQ) has this property.
It turns out that the approximations from Sections 3 and 4
are also useful in the context of Definition 3 when we choose
ELQ or AQ as the query language. In particular, it follows
from Theorem 7 that every ALC ontology OS has a finite
EL⊥ approximation w.r.t. AQ, namely the fragmentO−T of the
approximation scheme proposed in Section 4.
Theorem 8. Let OS be an ALC ontology, sig(OS) = Σ.
Then
1. the ontologyOωT from Section 4 is an EL⊥ approximation
of OS w.r.t. ELQ(Σ);
2. the ontology O−T from Section 4 is a (finite) EL⊥ approx-
imation of OS w.r.t. AQ;
3. if OS falls within ELU , then the ontology OωT from Sec-
tion 3 is an EL approximation of OS w.r.t. ELQ(Σ).
Point 2 also implies thatO−T is an EL approximation ofOS
w.r.t. AQ whenever OS is an ELU ontology. We close with an
interesting application of Theorem 8.
The topic of rewriting an OMQ into a simpler
query language has received a lot of interest in the
literature, see for example [Calvanese et al., 2007;
Gottlob et al., 2014; Kaminski et al., 2016;
Feier et al., 2019] and references therein. An OMQ Q is
(L,Q)-rewritable if there is an OMQ Q′ in the OMQ language
(L,Q) such that Q ≡ Q′. By virtue of Theorem 8, we can
decide whether an OMQ Q = (O,Σ, A(x)) from (ALC,AQ)
is (EL⊥,AQ)-rewritable: construct the finite approximation
O−T of O and check whether Q ≡ (O−T ,Σ, A(x)). The latter
is decidable [Bienvenu et al., 2014] and by Condition 2 of
Definition 3, the answer is ‘yes’ if and only if Q is (EL⊥,AQ)-
rewritable. We can extend this result to (ALC,ALCQ) since
every OMQ from this language is equivalent to one from
(ALC,AQ). Via the results in [Feier et al., 2018], this result
even extends further to a certain class of conjunctive queries.
Theorem 9. Given an OMQ Q ∈ (ALC,ALCQ), it is decid-
able whether Q is (EL⊥,AQ)-rewritable.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated the structure and finiteness of ontology
approximations when transitioning from non-Horn DLs to
Horn DLs. We believe that our results shed significant light
on the situation. It remains, however, an important and chal-
lenging topic for future work to push our techniques further
towards practical applicability. Also, there are many other
relevant cases of approximation. As a first step, one might
think about extending the DLs considered in this paper with
role inclusions. It might further be interesting to study the
problem to decide whether a given (finite) candidate is an
approximation of a given ontology. We expect this to be quite
non-trivial. A related result in [Lutz et al., 2012] states that
it is between EXPTIME and 2EXPTIME to decide whether a
given ELU ontology OS of a restricted syntactic form has a
finite complete EL approximation. Without the restriction,
even decidability is open.
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A Proofs for Propositions 1, 2, and 4
We state the results to be proved again.
Proposition 1. The ELU ontology
OS = { A v B1 unionsqB2,
∃r.Bi v Bi, for i ∈ {1, 2}
Bi uA′ v M for i ∈ {1, 2} }.
has a finite projective EL approximation, but every non-
projective EL approximation is infinite.
Proof. We show that OS has no finite non-projective EL ap-
proximation. Observe that the ontology O obtained from OS
by replacing the topmost CI with the infinite set
M = {A′ u ∃rn.A vM | n ≥ 0}
is an infinite non-projective EL approximation of OS . Now
assume for a proof by contradiction that there exists a finite
non-projective EL approximation of OS . Then, by compact-
ness of reasoning in EL, there exists a finite subset O′ of O
that is an EL approximation of OS . Let n be maximal such
that A′u∃rn.A vM ∈ O′. ThenO′ 6|= A′u∃rn+1.A vM
and we have derived a contradiction. o
To prove Proposition 2 and 4, we use the following lemma
from [Lutz and Wolter, 2010]. If C is an EL concept of the
form C1 u · · · u Cn, n ≥ 1, then the top-level conjuncts of C
are C1, . . . , Cn.
Lemma 3. Let O be an EL ontology and C,D be EL con-
cepts. Then O |= C v ∃r.D implies that
1. there exists a top-level conjunct ∃r.C ′ of C such that
O |= C ′ v D or
2. there exists a C ′ ∈ sub(O) such that O |= C v ∃r.C ′
and O |= C ′ v D.
Proposition 2. The ELU ontology
OS = { A v B1 unionsqB2,
∃r.B2 v ∃r.(B1 u L),
L v ∃s.L }
has no finite EL approximation.
Proof. Let OT be a (potentially projective) EL approximation
of OS . Then for all n ≥ 0 and m > n, we have
(a) OT |= ∃r.(A u ∃sn.>) v ∃r.(B1 u ∃sn.>) and
(b) OT 6|= ∃r.(A u ∃sn.>) v ∃r.(B1 u ∃sm.>)
since the same is true for OS . To establish the desired result,
it suffices to argue that for every n ≥ 0, there is a Cn ∈
sub(OT ) such that OT |= Cn v B1 u ∃sn.> and OT 6|=
Cn v B1 u ∃sm.> for any m > n. In fact, if this is the case,
then OT has infinitely many subconcepts and is thus infinite.
Let n ≥ 0. First note that
(c) OT 6|= A u ∃sn.> v B1.
because the same is true for OS . It follows from (a), (c),
and Lemma 3 that there exists a C ∈ sub(OT ) such that
OT |= ∃r.(Au∃sn.>) v ∃r.C andOT |= C v B1 u∃sn.>.
Set Cn = C. By choice and by (b), Cn is as desired. o
Proposition 4. Let OnS be obtained from the ontology OS in
Proposition 2 by replacing the bottommost CI with
L v A1 u Aˆ1 u · · · uAn u Aˆn u ∃r1.L u ∃r2.L
Then for all n, ` ≥ 1 and any `-bounded EL approximation
OT of OnS , ||OT || ≥ tower(`, n).
Proof. Assume that a depth bound ` ≥ 1 is given. EL concepts
C1, C2 are incomparable w.r.t. OS if neither OS |= C1 v C2
nor OS |= C2 v C1. Take a set Ω of EL concepts of depth
bounded by ` − 1 that are pairwise incomparable w.r.t. OS
and use only the symbols r1, r2, A1, Aˆ1, . . . , An, Aˆn. It is
straightforward to construct such a set Ω and that has size at
least tower(`, n). It then suffices to show that for every E ∈
Ω there exists a CE ∈ sub(OT ) such that OT |= CE v E
and OT 6|= CE v E′ for any E′ ∈ Ω with E′ 6= E.
Let E ∈ Ω. Then
(a) OT |= ∃r.(A u E) v ∃r.(B1 u E),
(b) OT 6|= ∃r.(AuE) v ∃r.(B1 uE′) for any E′ ∈ Ω with
E′ 6= E, and
(c) OT 6|= A u E v B1.
since the same is true for OS . Thus, similarly to the proof of
Proposition 2 we can show that must exist a C ∈ sub(OT )
such thatOT |= ∃r.(AuE) v ∃r.C andOT |= C v B1 uE
and use C as CE . o
B Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1. OS is not finitely generating iff for every n ≥ 0,
there is an ∃r.D ∈ sub(OS) that occurs on the right-hand
side of a CI and a sequence r1, . . . , rn of role names from OS
such that OS |= D v ∃r1. · · · .∃rn.>.
Proof. Observe that the number of non-logically equivalent
EL concepts over Σ = sig(OS) and of depth bounded by
n is finite, for any natural number n ≥ 0. Moreover, any
two EL concepts of distinct depth are not logically equivalent.
Thus, there are infinitely many non-logically equivalent OS-
generatable EL concepts if, and only if, for every n ≥ 0 there
exists an OS-generatable EL concept of depth n. The latter
holds if, and only if, for every n ≥ 0 there exist role names
r1, . . . , rn in OS such that ∃r1. · · · ∃rn.> is OS-generatable.
o
Theorem 1. It is decidable whether a given ELU-ontology
OS is finitely generating.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that it suffices to decide
whether there exists a bound ` ≥ 0 such that for every
∃r.D ∈ sub(OS) on the right hand side of a CI in OS
and any sequence r1, . . . , rn of role names in OS , if OS |=
D v ∃r1. · · · ∃rn.>, then n ≤ `. We show that there ex-
ists such an ` if, and only if, there exists such an ` with
` ≤ |sig(OS)| × 22||OS || . Then decidability follows di-
rectly. We use a straightforward pumping argument to show
the claim. Assume that there are n > |sig(OS)| × 22||OS || ,
∃r.D ∈ sub(OS) on the right hand side of a CI in OS , and
role names r1, . . . , rn in OS with OS |= D v ∃r1. · · · ∃rn.>.
We show that then there exists such a concept ∃r.D and se-
quence of role names of length n′ > n. An OS-type is a
subset t of the closure under single negation of sub(OS) such
that for any C ∈ sub(OS) either C ∈ t or ¬C ∈ t and there
exists a model I ofOS and d ∈ ∆I with d ∈ (
d
C∈t C)
I . We
identify anOS-type twith the concept
d
C∈t C and letD(OS)
be the set of disjunctions of OS-types (without repetitions).
We show that there exists a sequence X1, . . . , Xn ∈ D(OS)
such that
OS |= D v ∃r1.X1, OS |= Xi v ∃ri+1.Xi+1,
for all i < n. The proof is as follows. Let X1 be the set
of all OS-types t such that there exist a model I of OS and
d, e ∈ ∆I with (d, e) ∈ rI1 , d ∈ DI and e ∈ tI . Assume that
Xi has been defined. Then Xi+1 is the set of all OS-types
t such that there exist a model I of OS and d, e ∈ ∆I with
(d, e) ∈ rIi+1, d ∈ XIi and e ∈ tI . By definition
OS |= D v ∀r1.X1, OS |= Xi v ∀ri+1.Xi+1,
and now one can readily show by induction on i, and using
that OS |= D v ∃r1. · · · ∃rn.>, that
OS |= D v ∃r1.X1, OS |= Xi v ∃ri+1.Xi+1,
for all i < n. Thus, as n > |sig(OS)| × 22||OS || , there exist
1 < i < j ≤ n such that ri = rj and Xi = Xj . But then
OS |= D v ∃r1. · · · ∃rj−1.∃ri. · · · .∃rn.>,
and we have found the sequence of role names of length n +
(j − i) > n we wanted. o
C Proof of Theorem 2
C.1 Preliminaries
We write A |= C(a) if a ∈ CI where I is A viewed as an
interpretation in the obvious way. An ABoxA is ditree-shaped
if the directed graph GA = (Ind(A), {(a, b) | r(a, b) ∈ A})
is a tree and there are no multi-edges, that is, r(a, b), s(a, b) ∈
A implies r = s. Every EL concept C can be viewed as a
ditree-shaped ABox AC in an obvious way.
We will sometimes also use extended ABoxes, that is,
ABoxes A that can also contain concept assertions of the
form C(a), C a compound concept. If all concepts that occur
in such assertions are formulated in a description logic L, we
speak of extended L-ABoxes. If A is an extended ABox, then
we use A− to denote the non-extended ABox obtained from
A by removing all assertions C(a) where C is not a concept
name.
We next introduce a standard chase procedure for EL on-
tologies. The procedure uses ABoxes as a data structure. Let
O be an EL ontology. There is a single chase rule that can be
applied to an ABox A:
• if C v D ∈ O andA |= C(a), then a copy ofAD whose
individuals are disjoint from those in A and replace A
with the union of A and AD, identifying the root of the
latter with a.
The chase starts with an ABox A0 and exhaustively applies
the above rule in a fair way, resulting in sequence of ABoxes
A0,A1, . . . . The result of the chase is the (potentially infinite)
ABox
⋃
i≥0Ai obtained in the limit, denoted chO(A). The
result is unique since the chase is oblivious, that is, a rule can
applied to C v D and C(a) even if A |= D(a) already holds.
A proof of the following is standard and omitted.
Lemma 4. O |= C v D iff chO(AC) |= D(a0), for all EL
concepts C and D.
C.2 Main Proof
We start with soundness.
Lemma 5. OωT |= C0 v D0 implies OS |= C0 v D0 for allEL concepts C0, D0 over sig(OS).
Proof. Assume that OωT |= C0 v D0 where C0, D0 are EL
concepts over sig(OS). Then chOωT (AC0) |= D0(a0), a0 the
root ofAC0 . LetAC0 = A0,A1, . . . be a sequence of ABoxes
produced by the EL chase of AC0 with OωT . Clearly, all
ABoxes A0,A1, . . . are ditree-shaped and can thus be viewed
as an EL concept Ci. For an EL concept C over sig(OωT ), let
C↓ be the ELU concept obtained from C by replacing every
XD with D ∈ Dis(OS). We prove the following by induction
on i.
Claim. OS |= C↓i v C↓i+1 for all i ≥ 0.
To prove the claim, let i ≥ 0. Ai+1 was obtained from Ai by
applying the chase rule. Thus let C v D ∈ OωT , Ai |= C(a),
and let Ai+1 be obtained from Ai by taking a copy of AD
whose individuals are disjoint from those in Ai and defining
Ai+1 as the union of Ai and AD, identifying the root of the
latter with a. By definition of OωT , we have OS |= C↓ v D↓.
By construction of Ai+1, we thus have OS |= C↓i v C↓i+1 as
required and thus the claim is proved.
From chOωT (AC0) |= D0, we obtain Ai |= D0 for some i.
Since D0 is over sig(OS), Ai |= D0 implies ∅ |= C↓i v D0.
Together with the claim and since C0 = C
↓
0 , this gives OS |=
C0 v D0. o
We now address completeness, starting with the essential
Lemma 6 below. Preparing for the case of ELU⊥-to-EL⊥
approximations, we state and prove the lemma directly for this
case. This requires a few preliminaries.
Let O be an ELU⊥ ontology. For every EL concept C, we
define DisO(C) as in the case without ⊥. This can now be
the empty disjunction, which we identify with ⊥. In fact, C
is satisfiable w.r.t. O if and only if DisO(C) = ⊥. We set
⊥↑ = ⊥. We further associate with every EL concept C a
disjunction DisELO (C) that contains a disjunct
d
S for every
set S ⊆ sub−(O) such that there is a model I of O and a
d ∈ CI with
S = {E ∈ sub−(O) | d ∈ EI and E is an EL concept}
while this is not true for any proper subset of S. If DisELO (C)
consists of a single disjunct that is the empty conjunction, we
identify it with >. The empty disjunction is again identified
with ⊥.
For the following lemma, we assume that OS is an ELU⊥
ontology. The lemma refers to O−T . Note that when OS is
formulated in ELU , then O−T consists of all instantiations of
the first three lines of Figure 2 and that for ELU⊥, the same is
true for Figure 3. However, the first three lines of these figures
are identical.
Lemma 6. O−T |= C0 v DisELOS (C0)↑ for every EL con-
cept C0 over sig(OS).
We prove Lemma 6 by first introducing a special chase
procedure for ELU⊥ ontologies that is specifically tailored
towards our approximations. Unlike more standard chase
procedures for ELU⊥, our chase is deterministic rather than
disjunctive.
We define an entailment notion A ` C(a) between ex-
tended ELU⊥ ABoxes A and ELU⊥ concepts C as follows:
• A ` >(a) always holds;
• A ` ⊥(a) if ⊥(b) ∈ A for some b;
• A ` A(a) if A(a) ∈ A;
• A ` C1 u C2(a) if A ` C1(a) and A ` C2(a);
• A ` C1 unionsq C2(a) if C1 unionsq C2(a) ∈ A;
• A ` ∃r.C(a) if there is b such that r(a, b) ∈ A and
A ` C(b).
Note that if C is an EL concept, then A ` C(a) if a ∈ CIA−
where IA− is A− viewed as an interpretation in the obvious
way. Let DisO(C) be defined in the same way as DisELO (C)
except that all concepts in sub(O) that are concept names or
of the form ∃r.E are considered instead of only EL concepts
of this form.
LetA be an ABox andO an ELU⊥ ontology. The chase pro-
duces produces a sequence of ABoxes A = A0,A1,A2, · · ·
such that Ai ⊆ Ai+1 for all i ≥ 0. Although different se-
quences can be produced, the limit
⋃
i≥0Ai will be unique
and we call it the result of chasing A with O. We call an
individual in
⋃
i≥0Ai original if it already occurs in A and
anonymous otherwise. In the ABoxes Ai, anonymous individ-
uals can be marked or not. Each ABox Ai+1 is obtained from
Ai by chasing a single step with O, that is, Ai+1 is obtained
from Ai in one of the following ways:
1. choose C v D ∈ O and a ∈ Ind(A) with A ` C(a)
and add DNF(D)(a);
2. choose C1 u C2(a) ∈ A and add C1(a), C2(a);
3. choose ∃r.C(a) ∈ A and add r(a, b), C(b) for a fresh b;
we say that b was introduced for C;
4. choose D1(a) ∈ A with D1 ∈ Dis−(O) and D2, D3 ∈
Dis(O) such that A ` D2(a) and O |= D1 uD2 v D3,
and add D3(a);
5. choose r(a, b), D1(b) ∈ A with D1 ∈ Dis−(O) and
D2 ∈ Dis(O) such that O |= ∃r.D1 v D2 and add
D2(a);
6. choose D(a) ∈ A with D ∈ Dis−(O) and a anonymous
and introduced for C, and add DisO(C)(a); mark a;
7. choose r(a, b) ∈ Awith a anonymous and introduced for
Ca and bmarked, anonymous, and introduced forCb such
that DisO(∃r.Cb) ∈ Dis−(OS); add DisO(Ca)(a);
mark a if it is anonymous.
Note that Rules 1-3 implement Line 1 of our EL approxima-
tions O`T while Rules 4 and 5 correspond to Lines 2 and 3 of
the approximation. Rules 6-7 are there to deal with anony-
mous individuals which behave in a different way than original
ones.
We require that the chase is fair, that is, every possible way
to chase a single step is eventually used. Note that our chase
is oblivious, that is, a chase rule can be applied even if its
‘consequence’ is already there. This implies that the results
of the chase, which we denote with chspO(A), is unique up to
isomorphism.
The main property that we require of the chase is the fol-
lowing completeness property.
Lemma 7. Let O be an ELU⊥ ontology and C0 an EL con-
cept over sig(OS). Then chspO(AC0) ` DisELO (C0)(a0).
Since the proof of Lemma 7 is rather laborious, we defer it
to Section C.3.
We now return to the proof of Lemma 6. Let A0,A1, . . .
be a sequence of ABoxes generated by chasing AC0 = A0
with OS using the special chase introduced above. It is easy
to see that all extended ABoxes A0,A1, . . . are ditree-shaped
and can thus be viewed as ELU⊥ concepts C0, C1, . . . in
which all disjunctions are from Dis(OS). Note that also the
ABox assertions C(a) ∈ Ai with C a compound concept or
⊥ give raise to subconcepts in Ci.
Claim. O−T |= C↑i v C↑i+1, for all i ≥ 0.
To prove the claim, let i ≥ 0. We make a case distinction ac-
cording to the chase rule with whichAi+1 is obtained fromAi:
1. Then there is a C v D ∈ OS and an a ∈ Ind(A) such
thatAi ` C(a) andAi+1 = Ai ∪{DNF(D)(a)}. Let Ea
be the subconcept of Ci that corresponds to the subtree
rooted at a in Ai and let Fa be the subconcept of Ci+1
that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a inAi+1. Since
C is an EL concept, Ai ` C(a) implies A−i ` C(a).
Consequently, ∅ |= E↑a v C. Moreover, Fa = Ea u
DNF(D) and O−T contains the CI C v DNF(D)↑, thus
O−T |= C↑i v C↑i+1 as required.
2. Trivial.
3. Trivial.
4. Then there are D1(a) ∈ Ai with D1 ∈ Dis−(OS) and
D2, D3 ∈ Dis(OS) such that Ai ` D2(a), OS |= D1 u
D2 v D3, and Ai+1 = Ai ∪ {D3(a)}. Let Ea be the
subconcept of Ci that corresponds to the subtree rooted
at a in Ai and let Fa be the subconcept of Ci+1 that
corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in Ai+1. Then
Fa = Ea uD3. From D1(a) ∈ A and D1 ∈ Dis−(OS),
we obtain that XD1 is a top-level conjunct of E
↑
a . From
Ai ` D2(a), we obtain that ∅ |= E↑a v D↑2 . Moreover,
O−T contains the CI XD1 uD↑2 v D↑3 , and thus O−T |=
C↑i v C↑i+1 as required.
5. Similar to the previous case, using the third line of O−T .
6. Then there is a D(a) ∈ Ai with D ∈ Dis−(OS), a
anonymous and introduced for C, and Ai+1 = Ai ∪
{DisOS (C)(a)}. Let Ea be the subconcept of Ci that
corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in Ai and let
Fa be the subconcept of Ci+1 that corresponds to the
subtree rooted at a in Ai+1. Since a was introduced
for C, C(a) ∈ Ai and thus ∅ |= Ea v C. Since
C ∈ Dis(OS) and OS |= C v DisOS (C), O−T con-
tains the CI XD u C↑ v DisOS (C). Moreover, Fa =
Ea u DisOS (C). It follows that O−T |= C↑i v C↑i+1.
7. Similar to the previous case.
This finishes the proof of the claim.
By Lemma 7, chspOS (AC0) ` DisELOS (C0)(a0) and thus
Ai ` DisELOS (C0)(a0) for some i. First assume that
DisELOS (C0) contains more than one disjunct. Then, by defi-
nition of `, DisELOS (C0)(a0) ∈ Ai and thus XDisELOS (C0) =
DisELOS (C0)
↑ is a top-level conjunct of C↑i implying ∅ |=
C↑i v XELDisOS (C0). From the claim and C0 = C
↑
0 , we ob-
tain O−T |= C0 v C↑i and are done. Now assume that
DisELOS (C0) contains a single disjunct. Then Ai ` K for
each conjunct K of DisELOS (C0). By definition of ‘`’ and C↑i ,
it follows that ∅ |= C↑i v K↑ for each such K, and thus
∅ |= C↑i v DisELOS (C0)↑. It again remains to apply the claim.
Finally assume that DisELOS (C0) = ⊥. Then ⊥(b) ∈ Ai for
some b and thus ∅ |= C↑i v ⊥. We can once more apply the
claim. This finishes the proof of Lemma 6.
Now back to the proof of completeness, that is, of Lemma 2.
We need some more preliminaries.
Lemma 8. Let O be an ELU ontology and C,∃r.D EL con-
cepts. IfO |= C v ∃r.D andC contains no top-level conjunct
∃r.C ′ such that O |= C ′ v D, then D is O-generatable.
Proof. Assume O |= C v ∃r.D and C contains no top-level
conjunct ∃r.C ′ such that O |= C ′ v D. Assume D is not
O-generatable. Let
C = A1 u · · · uAn u ∃r1.E1 u · · · u ∃rm.Em.
In AC , the root a0 has outgoing edges
r1(a0, b1), . . . , rm(a0, bm). Extend AC to a model I
as follows:
1. add for any bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, a ditree-shaped model Ibi of
O with root bi such that bi ∈ EIbii and bi 6∈ DIbi ;
2. add for any ELU concept ∃r.E such that there is a CI
C ′ v D in O such that D contains ∃r.E as a top-level
conjunct an r-successor ar,E of a0 and a ditree-shaped
model Ir,E of O with root ar,E such that ar,E ∈ EIr,E
and ar,E 6∈ DIbi ;
3. a0 to AI for any concept name A.
Note that the interpretations Ibi exist since C contains no
top-level conjunct ∃r.C ′ such that O |= C ′ v D and the
interpretations Ir,E exist since we assume that D is not O-
generatable. By construction, a0 6∈ (∃r.D)I and I is a model
of O as all nodes distinct from a0 clearly satisfy all CIs in O
and a0 satisfies all CIs in O by construction. We have derived
a contradiction to O |= C v ∃r.D as a0 ∈ CI . o
For a ditree-shaped ABox A and k ≥ 0, we use A|k to denote
the result of removing from A all individuals on levels larger
than k and CaA to denote the subABox ofA rooted at a viewed
as an EL concept. To prepare for the case of ELU⊥-to-EL
approximations, we establish the following lemma directly for
ELU⊥ instead of for ELU .
Lemma 9. LetO be an ELU⊥ ontology such that all concepts
on the left hand side of CIs in O are EL concepts. Let A be a
ditree-shaped ABox with root a0 such that O,A |= ∃r.C(a0),
C an EL concept of depth k. Let A± be the extended ABox
obtained fromA|k by adding DisELO (CaA) whenever a is a leaf
in A|k. Then O,A± |= ∃r.C(a0).
Proof. Assume thatO,A± 6|= ∃r.C(a0). Take a ditree shaped
model I of O and A± with a0 6∈ (∃r.C)I . Let a be a node
of depth k in A. We have a ∈ DisELO (CaA)I and thus there
is a disjunct D of DisELO (C
a
A) with a ∈ DI . Let Aa be the
subABox of A rooted at a. Observe that Aa is satisfiable
w.r.t. O: otherwise ⊥ is the only disjunct of DisELO (CaA) and
so A± is not satisfiable. Thus O,A± |= ∃r.C(a0), and we
have derived a contraction. As Aa is satisfiable w.r.t. O we
obtain by definition of DisELO (C
a
A) that there is a model Ja of
O and Aa such that whenever a ∈ EJa for some EL concept
E ∈ sub−(O), then a ∈ EI . Construct a new interpretation
I ′ by adding to I the interpretation Ja, for all nodes a of
depth k in A (where I and Ja only share a). I ′ is a model of
O and A since a ∈ EI if a ∈ EI′ , for all EL concepts E ∈
sub−(O) and a of depth k in A. Moreover, a0 6∈ (∃r.C)I′ ,
as required. o
We are now in a position to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}. Then OS |= C0 v D0 implies
O`T |= C0 v D0 for all EL concepts C0, D0 over sig(OS)
such that the role depth of D0 is bounded by `.
Proof. Assume that OS |= C0 v D0 with C0, D0 EL con-
cepts over sig(OS) such that the role depth of D0 is bounded
by `. It clearly suffices to consider the cases where D0 is a
concept name and where it is of the form ∃r.E0.
We start with the former, so let D0 = A. Clearly, OS |=
C0 v A implies OS |= DisELOS (C0) v A. It thus follows
from Lemma 6 that O`T |= C0 v A. To see this, first assume
that DisELOS (C0) contains a single disjunct. Then A must be
a conjunct of DisELOS (C0) and it suffices to apply Lemma 6.
Now assume that DisELOS (C0) has more than one disjunct, that
is, it is in Dis−(OS). Then O`T contains the CI XDisELOS (C0) u
XDisELOS (C0)
v A (second line of Figure 2) and thus it again
suffices to apply Lemma 6.
The case where D0 = ∃r.E0 is a consequence of the fol-
lowing claim. For each a ∈ Ind(AC0), we write Ca0 as an
abbreviation for CaAC0 .
Claim. For all a ∈ Ind(AC0) and EL concepts ∃r.E of depth
`−depth(a),OS |= Ca0 v ∃r.E impliesO`T |= Ca0 v ∃r.E.
Proof of claim. The proof is by induction on the co-depth of a.
Induction start. Then a is a leaf in AC0 and thus Ca0 does not
have any top-level conjuncts of the form ∃r.E′. Lemma 8 thus
yields that E is OS-generatable. Thus Ca0 v ∃r.E is a CI inO`T .
Induction step. Then a is a non-leaf in AC0 . We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1. There is a top-level conjunct ∃r.E′ in Ca0 such thatOS |= E′ v E. Then a has an r-successor b in AC0 such that
Cb0 = E
′. Let
E = A1 u · · · uAn u ∃r1.E1 u · · · u ∃rm.Em.
Since we have already shown Lemma 2 for the case where
D0 is a concept name, we obtain O`T |= Cb0 v Ai for 1 ≤
i ≤ n. From the induction hypothesis, we further obtain
O`T |= Cb0 v ∃ri.Ei for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus O`T |= Cb0 v E
and consequently O`T |= Ca0 v ∃r.E as required.
Case 2. There is no top-level conjunct ∃r.E′ in Ca0 such
that OS |= E′ v E. Then Lemma 8 yields that E is
OS-generatable. Let A be the ditree-shaped subABox of
AC0 rooted at a and let A± be the extended ABox ob-
tained from A|k, with k the depth of ∃r.E, by adding
DisELOS (C
c
A)
↑(c) whenever c is a leaf in A|k. Applying
Lemma 9 to A and A± and with ∃r.E in place of ∃r.C, we
obtain OS ,A± |= ∃r.E(a). Let C± be A± viewed as an
ELU concept. Then OS |= C± v ∃r.E. Since E is OS-
generatable, (C±)↑ v ∃r.E is thus a CI in O`T . We next
observe that, by Lemma 6, O`T |= CcA v DisELOS (CcA)↑ and
thus O`T ,A |= DisELOS (CcA)↑(c) for all leaves c in A|k. To-
gether with the construction of A± and C±, this yields that
O`T |= Ca0 v (C±)↑. Together with (C±)↑ v ∃r.E being a
CI in O`T , we obtain O`T |= Ca0 v ∃r.E as required. o
C.3 Soundness and Completeness of the Special
Chase
Our main aim is to establish Lemma 7. We start, however, with
proving soundness of the chase. While this is interesting in its
own right, we are not going to use it directly in the context of
approximations. It is, however, an ingredient to the subsequent
completeness proof.
Lemma 10. Let C0 be an EL concept and O an ELU⊥ on-
tology. Then chspO(AC0) ` D(a0) implies O |= C0 v D for
all D ∈ Dis(O).
Proof. Let AC0 = A0,A1, . . . be a sequence generated by
chasing AC0 with O using the special chase. Further, let I be
a model of O and let d ∈ CI0 . An extended homomorphism
from Ai to I is a function h : Ind(A)→ ∆I such that
1. C(a) ∈ Ai,C potentially compound, implies h(a) ∈ CI
and
2. r(a, b) ∈ Ai implies (h(a), h(b)) ∈ rI .
We next observe the following.
Claim. if Ai ` D(a), a ∈ Ind(Ai) and D ∈ Dis(O), and h
is an extended homomorphism fromAi to I , then h(a) ∈ DI .
The claim can be proved by induction on the structure of D.
If D takes the form D1 uD2 or ∃r.D1, then this is straight-
forward using the semantics and induction hypothesis. If D
is >, ⊥, a concept name, or of the form D1 unionsqD2 (note that
in the latter case Ai ` D(a) implies D(a) ∈ Ai), then this is
immediate by definition of extended homomorphisms.
We show by induction on i that for each i ≥ 0, there is an
extended homomorphism hi from Ai to I with h(a0) = d.
This is trivial for i = 0 since d ∈ CI0 . For i ≥ 0, we make
a case distinction according to the rule that was applied to
obtain Ai+1 from Ai:
1. Then there is a C v D ∈ O and an a ∈ Ind(A) such
that Ai ` C(a) and Ai+1 = Ai ∪ {DNF(D)(a)}. By
the claim, Ai ` C(a) implies hi(a) ∈ CI . Since I is a
model of O, hi(a) ∈ DI = DNF(D)I and consequently
hi can be extended to an extended homomorphism hi+1
from Ai+1 to I.
2. Trivial.
3. Trivial.
4. Then there are D1(a) ∈ Ai with D1 ∈ Dis−(O) and
D2, D3 ∈ Dis(O) such that Ai ` D2(a), O |= D1 u
D2 v D3, and Ai+1 = Ai ∪ {D3(a)}. From D1(a) ∈
Ai, Ai ` D2(a), and the claim, we get hi(a) ∈ (D1 u
D2)
I . Since I is a model of O, hi(a) ∈ D3(a). Thus,
we can choose hi+1 = hi.
5. Similar to the previous case.
6. Then there is a D(a) ∈ Ai with D ∈ Dis−(O),
a anonymous and introduced for C, and Ai+1 =
Ai ∪ {DisO(C)(a)}. We have C(a) ∈ Ai, and thus
h(a) ∈ CI . Since I is a model of O, this implies
h(a) ∈ DisO(C)I and thus we can choose hi+1 = hi.
7. Similar to the previous case.
We now finish the proof of Lemma 10. Let chspO(AC0) `
D(a0) with D ∈ Dis(O). Then there is an Ai with Ai `
D(a0). From the claim, we obtain d = hi(a0) ∈ CI . Since
this holds for all I and d, we have shown that O |= C0 v D,
as required. o
Lemma 7. Let O be an ELU⊥ ontology and C0 an EL con-
cept over sig(OS). Then chspO(AC0) ` DisELO (C0)(a0).
Proof. We start with a special case, which is that ⊥(b) ∈
ch
sp
O(AC0) for some b. By Lemma 10, O |= C0 v ⊥ and thus
DisELO (C0) = ⊥. By definition of ‘`’, chspO(AC0) ` ⊥(a0)
and thus we are done. In what follows, we can thus assume
that ⊥(b) /∈ chspO(AC0) for all b.
To deal with the general case, assume to the contrary of
what we have to prove that chspO(AC0) 6` DisELO (C0)(a0). We
are going to construct from chspO(AC0) a model I ofO with an
element d such that d ∈ CI0 \ (DisELO (C0))I , in contradiction
to the definition of DisELO (C0).
An original a ∈ Ind(chspO(AC0)) is disjunctive if
ch
sp
O(AC0) contains at least one assertion D(a) with D ∈
Dis−(O). With each original disjunctive a, we associate a
disjunction
Da = DisO(
l
{D ∈ Dis(O) | chspO(AC0) ` D(a)}).
For the above definition, it is important to note that
sub−(O) ⊆ Dis(O) and thus also all C ∈ sub−(O) with
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` C(a) contribute to the definition of Da. We
observe the following:
(P1) If chspO(AC0) ` D(a) with D ∈ Dis(O), then ∅ |=
Da v D.
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` D(a) implies
∅ |=
l
{D′ ∈ Dis(O) | chspO(AC0) ` D′(a0)} v D.
By definition of DisO,
∅ |= Da v
l
{D′ ∈ Dis(O) | chspO(AC0) ` D′(a0)}
and thus ∅ |= Da v D.
(P2) If ∅ |= Da v D ∈ Dis(O), then D(a) ∈ chspO(AC0).
Since a is disjunctive, there is some D1(a) ∈ chspO(AC0)
with D1 ∈ Dis−(O). Let D1, . . . , Dk be all disjunc-
tions from Dis(O) with chspO(AC0) ` Di(a). Consider
DisO(D1uD2). In the very special case that this disjunc-
tion consists of a single disjunct that contains all concepts
from sub−(O) as conjuncts, DisO(D1 uD2) = Da and
Rule 4 applied to D1 and D2 yields Da(a) ∈ chspO(AC0)
as required. Otherwise, we find some D′ with at least two
disjuncts such that ∅ |= DisO(D1 uD2) v D′2. We can
apply Rule 4 again to show D′2(a) ∈ chspO(AC0). Since
D′2 has at least two disjuncts, we can proceed in the same
way applying Rule 4 to D′2, D3, then to D
′
3, D4, and so
on. In the last step, we can clearly choose Da as D′k. Fi-
nally, another application of Rule 4 with D1 = D2 = Da
and D3 = D yields D(a) ∈ chspO(AC0).
Note that it follows from (P2) and the assumption that ⊥(a) /∈
ch
sp
O(AC0) that Da 6= ⊥, that is, Da has at least one disjunct.
We now consider each original disjunctive a ∈
Ind(chspO(AC0)), identify a disjunct Ea of Da and extend
ch
sp
O(AC0) with D(a) for each D ∈ Dis(O) with ∅ |= Ea v
D. We then show that no new applications of chase rules are
possible afterwards, with the possible exception of applica-
tions of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individuals a. We also
select an Ea for each original non-disjunctive a, in a trivial
way: Ea is then the conjunction of all C ∈ sub−(O) such
that chspO(AC0) ` C(a).
We start at the root a0 (if it is disjunctive). Recall our
assumption that chspO(AC0) 6` DisELO (C0)(a0). There must
be a disjunct Ea0 of Da0 such that ∅ 6|= Ea0 v DisELO (C0)
as otherwise ∅ |= Da0 v DisELO (C0) and thus (P2) yields
DisELO (C0)(a0) ∈ chspO(AC0). Together with Rules 2 and 3,
this yields chspO(AC0) ` DisELO (C0)(a0), a contradiction. Let
A+ denote the result of extending chspO(AC0) for Ea0 as de-
scribed above. We observe the following counterpart of (P1)
for A+.
(P3) if A+ ` D(a0) with D ∈ Dis(O), then ∅ |= Ea0 v D.
If chspO(AC0) ` D(a0), then this follows from (P1). Oth-
erwise, by definition of ` and construction of A+, we
must have ∅ |= dS v D where S contains
1. all concepts D′ ∈ Dis(O) such that chspO(AC0) `
D′(a0) and
2. all concepts D′ with D′(a0) fresh in A+.
(P1) implies ∅ |= Ea0 v D′ for all concepts D′ from
Point 1 and the construction ofA+ yields ∅ |= Ea0 v D′
for all concepts D′ from Point 2. Thus ∅ |= Ea0 v D.
We show that no new rule applications are possible, except for
applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individuals:
• Rule 1. Assume that A+ ` C(a0) and that C v D ∈ O.
Then (P3) yields ∅ |= Ea0 v C. By definition of Da0 ,
this implies that C is a conjunct of Ea0 . Let D be of the
formC1u· · ·uCnuD1u· · ·uDm whereC1, . . . , Cn are
concept names or existential restrictions andD1, . . . , Dm
are disjunctions. Then C1, . . . , Cn must also be con-
juncts in Ea0 . Moreover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, DNF(Di) must
contain a disjunct G such that all conjuncts of G are in
Ea0 . This implies ∅ |= Ea0 v DNF(D). Consequently,
DNF(D)(a0) is in A+.
• Rule 2. If C1 u C2(a0) is fresh in A+, then C1 u C2 ∈
Dis(O) is such that ∅ |= Ea0 v C1 u C2. Thus∅ |= Ea0 v Ci for i ∈ {1, 2} and as a consequence,
C1(a0), C2(a0) are also in A+.
• Rule 3. New applications of Rule 3 are possible only to
a0, which is original and disjunctive.
• Rule 4. Assume that D1(a0) is in A+, D1 ∈ Dis−(O),
that A+ ` D2(a0), and that O |= D1 uD2 v D3. We
have ∅ |= Ea0 v D1: if D1(a0) is fresh in A+, then this
is clear; otherwise, D1(a0) ∈ chspO(AC0), which implies
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` D1(a0) since D1 ∈ Dis−(O), and thus
(P1) yields ∅ |= Ea0 v D1. Moreover, ∅ |= Ea0 v D2
by (P3). By definition of Da0 , ∅ |= Ea0 v D3 and thus
D3(a0) is in A+.
• Rule 5. Trivially not applicable since a0 has no predeces-
sors.
• Rule 6 and 7. Only apply to anonymous individuals, but
a0 is original.
This finishes the extension of chspO(AC0) at a0. From now
on, we assume that this extension has been incorporated into
ch
sp
O(AC0), that is, we write chspO(AC0) in place of A+. Triv-
ially, property (P1) still holds for all a 6= a0 and property (P2)
is preserved.
We then apply the following extension as long as possi-
ble. Choose some r(b, a) ∈ chspO(AC0) with a original and
disjunctive and assume that Eb was already determined and
ch
sp
O(AC0) extended accordingly (the latter only if b is dis-
junctive). We argue that there must be a disjunct Ea of Da
such that the following properties are satisfied:
(a) ∅ |= Ea v C and ∃r.C ∈ sub(O) implies chspO(AC0) `∃r.C(b);
(b) ∅ |= Ea v D1 ∈ Dis−(O) and O |= ∃r.D1 v D2 with
D2 ∈ Dis(O) implies that D2(b) ∈ chspO(AC0).
Assume that this is not the case. Let Da = E1 unionsq · · · unionsqEk. For
1 ≤ i ≤ k, we then find one of the following:
(i) D′i = ∃r.Di ∈ sub(O) with ∅ |= Ei v Di and
ch
sp
O(AC0) 6` D′i(b).
(ii) Di ∈ Dis−(O) and D′i ∈ Dis(O) such that ∅ |= Ei v
Di, O |= ∃r.Di v D′i, and D′i(b) /∈ chspO(AC0).
Let DL denote the result of removing identical disjuncts fromunionsq
1≤i≤k
Di and DR the result of removing identical disjuncts
from unionsq
1≤i≤k
D′i. We have DL, DR ∈ Dis(O) while this need
not be true for the disjunctions that they have been obtained
from. Clearly, O |= ∃r.DL v DR. Since each Di is from
Dis−(O), DL ∈ Dis−(O) while this is not guaranteed for
DR even when k > 1. Since O |= ∃r.DL v DR and since
DL is from Dis−(O), Rule 5 yields DR(b) ∈ chspO(AC0).
due to Rules 2 and 3, this implies chspO(AC0) ` DR(b). We
distinguish two cases.
First assume that b is disjunctive. Then Db is defined and
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` DR(b) and (P2) yield ∅ |= Db v DR. It fol-
lows that there is a disjunct K of DR with ∅ |= Eb v K.
Consequently, ∅ |= Eb v D′i for some i. It follows that when
ch
sp
O(AC0) was extended for b, then D′i(b) has been added to
ch
sp
O(AC0). If Di, D′i come from Case (ii), then this is an im-
mediate contradiction. Otherwise, non-applicability of Rules 2
and 3 yields chspO(AC0) ` D′i(b), a contradiction to Case (i).
Now assume that b is not disjunctive. Since DR(b) ∈
ch
sp
O(AC0), this implies that DR has only a single disjunct
K. This implies that D′1 = · · · = D′k = K. From
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` DR(b) andDR(b) ∈ chspO(AC0), we thus obtain
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` D′1(b) and D′1(b) ∈ chspO(AC0), a contradiction
in Case (i) and (ii), respectively.
We now extend chspO(AC0) for Ea as described above. We
observe the same property (P3) as above, the proof is identical:
(P3) if A+ ` D(a) with D ∈ Dis(O), then ∅ |= Ea v D.
We again show that no new rule applications are possible
except applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individ-
uals. We only consider those cases explicitly for which the
arguments are not the same as above:
• Rule 1. Assume that A+ ` C(c) and that C v D ∈
O. We can use Property (a) to show that the former
implies chspO(AC0) ` C(c) whenever c 6= a, and thus
non-applicability of Rule 1 before the extension ensures
DNF(D)(c) ∈ chspO(AC0) ⊆ A+. Now assume that c =
a. From A+ ` C(a) and (P3), we obtain ∅ |= Ea v C.
By definition of Da, this implies ∅ |= Ea v DNF(D),
and consequently DNF(a) is in A+.
• Rule 4. Assume that D1(c) is in A+, D1 ∈ Dis−(O),
that A+ ` D2(c), and that O |= D1 uD2 v D3. First
assume that c 6= a. Then D1(c) ∈ chspO(AC0). More-
over, we can use Property (a) to show that A+ ` D2(c)
implies chspO(AC0) ` D2(c). Thus, Rule 4 yields
D2(c) ∈ chspO(AC0) ⊆ A+. Now assume that c = a.
Then ∅ |= Ea v D1: if D1(a) is fresh inA+, then this is
clear; otherwise, otherwise, D1(a) ∈ chspO(AC0), which
implies chspO(AC0) ` D1(a) since D1 ∈ Dis−(O), and
thus (P1) yields ∅ |= Ea v D1. Moreover, ∅ |= Ea v
D2 by (P3). By definition of Da, ∅ |= Ea v D2 and thus
D2(a) is in A+.
• Rule 5. Assume that r(b, c), D1(c) ∈ A+ with D1(c)
fresh and D1 ∈ Dis−(O). Assume further that O |=
∃r.D1 v D2. Clearly, we must have c = a. Since
D1(a) ∈ A+ and D1 ∈ Dis−(O), A+ ` D1(a). Thus
(P2) yields ∅ |= Ea v D1 and from Property (b) we
obtain D2(b) ∈ chspO(AC0) ⊆ A+.
This finishes the extension of chspO(AC0) at a. It is not hard to
verify that (P1) holds for all original disjunctive a for which the
extension has not yet been carried out, (P2) is preserved, and
(P3) holds for all original disjunctive a for which the extension
has already been carried out. In particular, the extension of
ch
sp
O(AC0) at a does not invalidate (P3) for original disjunctive
a′ that have been treated earlier due to Property (a). We
continue until the extension has taken place for all original
disjunctive a and use E to denote the ABox that is obtained
in the limit. No new rule applications are possible with the
exception of applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive
individuals.
Recall that we aim to construct a model I of O with an
element d such that d ∈ CI0 \ (DisELO (C0))I . We are going to
start from E−, that is, E restricted to role assertions and atomic
concept assertions, viewed as an interpretation. The resulting
interpretation I, however, need not be a model of O, for two
reasons. First, new applications of Rule 3 to original disjunc-
tive individuals a are possible which means that there might
be assertions ∃r.C(a) ∈ E such that a /∈ (∃r.C)I , and this in
turn means that some CIs in O might not be satisfied. And
second, we have chosen disjuncts Ea of the disjunctions Da at
original disjunctive individuals to ensure that all disjunctions
are satisfied at original individuals, but we have not ensured
the same at anonymous individuals. We thus modify the initial
I in two ways, which both involve grafting additional tree-
shaped interpretations that we select in what follows. We first
observe that
(∗) If C(a) ∈ E with a original and disjunctive, then ∅ |=
Ea v C.
To see this, first assume that ∃r.C(a) ∈ chspO(AC0) already
before the extension to E . Then non-applicability of Rules 2
and 3 implies chspO(AC0) ` C(a) and (P3) yields ∅ |= Ea v
C. Otherwise, ∅ |= Ea v C by construction of E .
By (∗) and the (semantic!) definition of Da of which Ea is
a disjunct, we find for each ∃r.C(a) ∈ E with a original and
disjunctive, a tree model I∃r.C(a) of O with root d such that
d ∈ CI∃r.C(a) and d ∈ F I∃r.C(a) implies ∅ |= Ea v ∃r.F for
all ∃r.F ∈ sub(O).
Let Γ denote the set of individuals a in chspO(AC0) that are
anonymous and marked and whose predecessor is anonymous
and unmarked.3 Let a ∈ Γ have been introduced for Ca and
let r(b, a) be the unique assertion of this form in chspO(AC0).
3We work here with the anonymous part, which is identical in
ch
sp
O(AC0) and in E .
Since Rule 5 is not applicable, DisO(∃r.Ca)(b) ∈ chspO(AC0)
and since b is anonymous and not marked, DisO(∃r.Ca) /∈
Dis−(O). Furthermore, DisO(∃r.Ca) is not empty since we
assume that chspO(AC0) contains no assertion of the form⊥(b).
Consequently, we find a tree model Ia ofO with root a ∈ CIaa
such that, in the extension J of Ia obtained by adding an r-
predecessor b to the root a of Ia, we have b ∈ (∃r.C)J iff
O |= Ca v C for all ∃r.C ∈ sub(O).
Construct an interpretation I as follows:
• start with E− viewed as an interpretation;
• for each ∃r.C(a) ∈ E with a original and disjunctive,
disjointly add the interpretation I∃r.C(a) with root d and
extend rI with (a, d);
• for each a ∈ Γ, replace the subtree rooted at a with Ia.
We next observe the following.
Claim 1. Let a ∈ ∆I be an individual of chspO(AC0) and let
C ∈ sub(O) be an EL concept. Then a ∈ CI implies
1. ∅ |= Ea v C if a is original and disjunctive, and
2. chspO(AC0) ` C(a) otherwise.
The proof is by induction on the structure of C. In the in-
duction start, C = A is a concept name. Since a ∈ AI , we
must have A(a) ∈ E and thus E ` A(a). If a is original and
disjunctive, then (P3) yields ∅ |= Ea v C as required. If this
is not the case, then A(a) ∈ E implies A(a) ∈ chspO(AC0),
thus chspO(AC0) ` A(a) as required.
The case C = C1 u C2 is straightforward using the seman-
tics and induction hypothesis. Details are left to the reader.
It thus remains to deal with the case C = ∃r.C1. Then
a ∈ CI implies that there is a d ∈ CI1 with (a, d) ∈ rI . We
distinguish several cases. First assume that d is an individ-
ual from chspO(AC0) that is not in Γ. We have the following
subcase:
1. a and d are original and disjunctive.
The induction hypothesis yields ∅ |= Ed v C1. Thus
Condition (a) from the extension step ensures that
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` ∃r.C1(a). Property (P1) yields ∅ |= Ea v∃r.C1, as required.
2. a is original and disjunctive and d is not.
The induction hypothesis yields chspO(AC0) ` C1(d) and
the construction of I yields r(a, d) ∈ chspO(AC0), thus
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` ∃r.C1(a). Property (P1) yields ∅ |= Ea v∃r.C1, as required.
3. d is original and disjunctive and a is not.
The induction hypothesis yields ∅ |= Ed v C1. Thus
Condition (a) from the extension step ensures that
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` ∃r.C1(a), as required.
4. neither a nor d are original and disjunctive.
The induction hypothesis yields chspO(AC0) ` C1(d) and
the construction of I yields r(a, d) ∈ chspO(AC0), thus
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` ∃r.C1(a), as required.
The following cases remain:
5. a is original and disjunctive and there is an ∃r.E(a) ∈
ch
sp
O(AC0) such that d is the root of I∃r.E(a).
By choice of I∃r.E(a), this implies ∅ |= Ea v ∃r.C1, as
required.
6. d ∈ Γ and thus the root of Id.
Then d ∈ CId1 . By choice of Id and since ∃r.C1 ∈
sub(O), we have O |= Cd v C1 where Cd is the
concept that d was introduced for. We moreover have
Cd(d) ∈ chspO(AC0) and by non-applicability of Rules 2
and 3 also chspO(AC0) ` Cd(d). Since d is in Γ, it
is marked. Thus D(d) ∈ chspO(AC0) for some D ∈
Dis−(O). Clearly, O |= D u Cd v C1. We can thus
invoke Rule 4 with D1 = D, D2 = Cd, and D3 = C1
to yield C1(d) ∈ chspO(AC0). Rules 2 and 3 thus ensure
that chspO(AC0) ` C1(d). From (a, d) ∈ rI , we obtain
r(a, d) ∈ chspO(AC0), and thus chspO(AC0) ` ∃r.C1(a)
as required (since a cannot be original).
This finishes the proof of the claim.
Claim 2. Let a ∈ ∆I be an individual of chspO(AC0) and let
C ∈ sub(O). Then chspO(AC0) ` C(a) implies a ∈ CI .
The proof is by induction on the structure of C. The case that
C is a concept name is clear by construction of I. The case
that C = C1 u C2 and C = ∃r.C1 are straightforward using
the fact that Rules 2 and 3 are not applicable and the induction
hypothesis. It remains to deal with the case C = C1 unionsq C2.
Then C1 unionsq C2(a) ∈ chspO(AC0) and thus a is disjunctive and
C1 unionsq C2 is a conjunct of every disjunct of Da, including the
disjunct Ea chosen for a during the extension of ch
sp
O(AC0).
By definition ofDa, it follows that someCi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is also
a conjunct of Ea. Thus Ci(a) has been added in the extension
of chspO(AC0) and it remains to apply the induction hypothesis.
This finishes the proof of Claim 4
Note that I is a tree interpretation with root a0. By con-
struction of I , it is clear that a0 ∈ CI0 . We next show that I is
a model of O.
Let C v D ∈ O and let d ∈ CI . If d is in the domain of
some interpretation I∃r.C(a) or Ia, then it follows from the
construction of I and the fact that all interpretations I∃r.C(a)
and Ia are models of O that d ∈ DI . Thus let a be an
individual of chspO(AC0). We distinguish two cases.
First assume that a is original and disjunctive. Then Point 1
of Claim 1 yields ∅ |= Ea v C and as a consequence we
have ∅ |= Ea v D which implies F (a) ∈ E for all top-level
conjuncts F of D. If F is a concept name, then this yields
a ∈ F I by construction of I. If F takes the form ∃r.G,
then the addition of I∃r.G ensures that a ∈ (∃r.G)I . As a
consequence, a ∈ DI .
Now assume that a is not original or not disjunctive.
Then Point 2 of Claim 1 yields chspO(AC0) ` C(a). Non-
applicability of Rule 1 of the chase yields DNF(D)(a) ∈
ch
sp
O(AC0) and non-applicability of Rules 2 and 3 yields
ch
sp
O(AC0) ` DNF(D)(a). By Claim 2, a ∈ DI .
It remains to show that a0 /∈ DisELO (C0)I . Assume to the
contrary that a0 ∈ DisELO (C0)I . Then there is a disjunct K
of DisELO (C0)
I such that a0 ∈ CI for every conjunct C of K.
We distinguish two cases.
First assume that a0 is disjunctive. By Point 1 of Claim 1,
∅ |= Ea0 v C for all conjuncts C of K. Thus ∅ |= Ea0 v
DisELO (C0), in contradiction to our choice of Ea0 .
Now assume that a0 is not disjunctive. By Point 2 of
Claim 1, chspO(AC0) ` C(a0) for all disjuncts C of K. By
Lemma 10, O |= C0 v C for all such C. Since I is a model
of O, this implies that DisELO (C0) has only the disjunct K.
We have thus shown that chspO(AC0) ` DisELO (C0), a contrac-
tion. o
D Proof of Theorem 3
Let 1Dis(OS) denote the set of disjunctions of concepts from
sub−(OS), without repetition, of which there are clearly only
single exponentially many. For each D ∈ Dis(OS), let KD
be the set of disjunctions D′ ∈ 1Dis(OS) such that D′ is
a conjunct of the result of converting D viewed as a DNF
formula (in which all concept names and concepts ∃r.E serve
as propositional variables) into KNF. We then have ∅ |= D ≡d
KD. For ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}, let the EL ontology Ô`T be defined
as O`T in Figure 2, but with every occurrence of a concept
name XD replaced by
d
C∈KD YC .
Theorem 3 is a consequence of the following.
Lemma 11. Let ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}. For all EL concepts C0, D0
over sig(OS), O`T |= C v D iff Ô`T |= C v D.
Proof. It suffices to show that for every model I of O`T there
is a model Î of Ô`T such that the restrictions of I and Î to the
symbols of sig(OS) are identical and vice versa.
We start with the easier direction. Thus let Î be a
model of Ô`T . Let I be defined like Î except that XID =d
D′∈KD Y
Î
D′ . Observe that the concept names XD are not in
sig(OS) and thus the restrictions of I and Î to the symbols of
sig(OS) are identical, as required. It is not straightforward to
verify that I satisfies every CI C1 v C2 ∈ O`T given that Ô`T
contains a CI C ′1 v C ′2 such that C ′i can be obtained from C ′
by replacing each XD with
d
D′∈KD YD′ and that Î satisfies
C ′1 v C ′2.
For the converse direction, let I be a model of O`T . We can-
not define a corresponding Î of Ô`T by setting
d
D′∈KD Y
Î
D′ =
XID because we need to interpret individual concept names
YD′ rather than conjunctions thereof. To achieve this, we re-
sort to semantic disjunctions DisOS (D). In fact, we define Î
to be like I except that
Y ÎD =
(
DisOS (D)
↑ u ( unionsq
D′∈Dis−(OS)|D∈KD′
XD′
))I
for everyD ∈ 1Dis(OS). It remains to show that Î is a model
of of Ô`T . We can argue exactly as in the converse direction
if we know that
d
D′∈KD Y
Î
D′ = X
I
D for all D ∈ Dis−(OS).
By definition of Î, this amounts to showing that( l
D′∈KD
DisOS (D
′)↑u( unionsq
D′′∈Dis−(OS)|D′∈KD′′
XD′′
))I
= XID.
For the ‘⊇’ direction, we note that OS |= D v DisOS (D′)↑
for every D′ ∈ KD since ∅ |= D v D′ and due to
the definition of DisOS (D
′). Thus O`T contains the CI
XD u XD v DisOS (D′)↑ and consequently O`T |= XD v
DisOS (D
′) u XD for every D′ ∈ KD. It suffices to recall
that I is a model of O`T .
For the ‘⊆’ direction, assume that
d ∈ (
l
D′∈KD
DisOS (D
′)↑ uXD′′0 )I
for some D′′0 ∈ Dis−(OS). Let KD = {D1, . . . , Dk} and let
D′1 = DisOS (D
′′
0 uD1).
We first argue that d ∈ (D′1↑)I . This follows from OS |=
D′′0 u D1 v D′1 and the fact that, thus, O`T contains the CI
XD′′0 uD
↑
1 v D′1↑ and since I is a model of O`T .
In the very special case that D′1 consists of a single disjunct
that contains all concepts from sub−(OS) as conjuncts, we
actually have OS |= D′′0 uD1 v D, and thus we can argue
as above that d ∈ (D↑)I and are done since D↑ = XD given
that D ∈ Dis−(OS).
Otherwise, we can find a D′′1 ∈ Dis(OS) with at least two
disjuncts such that ∅ |= D′1 ≡ D′′1 . Let D′2 = DisOS (D′′1 u
D2). As in the case of D′′1 , we can show that d ∈ (D′2↑)I .
We can repeat this until we have shown that d ∈ (D′k↑)I ,
D′k = DisOS (D
′′
k−1uDk). Again, we are done if D′k consists
of a single disjunct that contains all concepts from sub−(OS)
as conjuncts. Otherwise, we can find a a D′′k ∈ Dis(OS) with
at least two disjuncts such that ∅ |= D′k ≡ D′′1 .
By construction of D′k and choice of D
′′
k , we must have
OS |= D′′k v D. ThusO`T contains the CI XD′′k uD′′k
↑ v D↑.
It follows that d ∈ XID. o
E Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 2 follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Let O be an acyclic ELU ontology and let
C = A1 u · · · uAn u ∃r1.E1 u · · · u ∃rm.Em, D = ∃r.E
be EL concepts such that O |= C v D and there does not
exist any i ≤ m with ri = r and O |= Ei v E. Then there
exists i ≤ n with O |= Ai v D.
Proof. Assume the lemma does not hold. Take tree shaped
interpretations Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with root ai and Ji, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
with root bi such that all Ii,Ji are models of O and
• ai ∈ AIii and ai 6∈ DIi , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• bi ∈ EJii and bi 6∈ EIi , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Construct a model I by taking the disjoint union of all Ii,Ji
and then identifying all ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, to a single node a and
adding (a, bi) to the interpretation of ri. Next define I ′ by
adding in I, recursively, a to the interpretation of a concept
name A if there exists C such that A ≡ C ∈ O and a ∈ CI .
We claim that I ′ is a model ofO and a 6∈ DI . The latter holds
by definition. For the former, consider some A′ ≡ C ′ ∈ O′
for which a has not been added to the interpretation of A′
in the step above (the remaining CIs are trivially true in I ′).
Then it only remains to check that a ∈ A′I implies a ∈ C ′I ,
but this follows by construction again. o
F Proof of Theorems 6 and 7
The EL chase introduced in Appendix C.1 can be extended
to EL⊥ in a straightforward way. Recall that we assume ⊥
to occur only in CIs of the form C v ⊥. The EL⊥ chase is
defined exactly as the EL chase. In particular, it also treats CIs
of the form C v ⊥, adding ⊥(a) to an ABox A when A |=
C(a), and thus producing EL⊥ extended ABoxes. We write
chO(AC) |= ⊥ if there is some a with ⊥(a) ∈ chO(AC).
The correctness of the chase now reads as follows.
Lemma 13. LetO be an EL⊥ ontology and let C,D be EL⊥
concepts. Then O |= C v D iff chO(AC) |= D(a0) or
chO(AC) |= ⊥.
Based on Lemma 13, we can prove the soundness of the
approximation. The proof is essentially identical to that of
Lemma 5, that is, to the correctness of the approximation in
the ELU-to-EL case. We omit details.
Lemma 14. OωT |= C0 v D0 impliesOS |= C0 v D0 for allEL concepts C0, D0 over sig(OS).
Now for completeness. Recall that we have established the
central Lemma 6 already for the case where OS is an ELU⊥
ontology. The same is true for Lemma 9.
Lemma 15. Let ` ∈ N ∪ {ω}. Then OS |= C0 v D0 implies
O`T |= C0 v D0 for all EL concepts C0, D0 over sig(OS)
such that the role depth of D0 is bounded by `.
Proof. Assume that OS |= C0 v D0 with C0, D0 EL con-
cepts over sig(OS) such that the role depth of D0 is bounded
by `. If C0 contains ⊥, then clearly O`T |= C0 v D0. If D0
contains ⊥, then it is equivalent to ⊥. We can thus assume
that C0 is an EL concept and it suffices to consider the cases
where D0 is ⊥, a concept name, or of the form ∃r.E0.
We start with the case D0 = ⊥. Then OS |= C0 v D0
implies that DisELOS (C0) is ⊥ (that is, it is the empty disjunc-
tion), and consequently Lemma 6 yields O`T |= C0 v ⊥ as
required.
Now let D0 = A. Clearly, OS |= C0 v A implies OS |=
DisELOS (C0) v A. It thus follows from Lemma 6 that O`T |=
C0 v A (see proof of Lemma 15 for details).
The case where D0 = ∃r.E0 is a consequence of the fol-
lowing claim. For each a ∈ Ind(AC0), we write Ca0 as an
abbreviation for CaAC0 .
Claim. For all a ∈ Ind(AC0) and EL concepts ∃r.E of depth
`−depth(a),OS |= Ca0 v ∃r.E impliesO`T |= Ca0 v ∃r.E.
Proof of claim. The proof is by induction on the codepth of a.
Induction start. Then a is a leaf in AC0 and thus Ca0 does not
have any top-level conjuncts of the form ∃r.E′. Thus Condi-
tion 1 from Figure 3 is satisfied for F = Ca0 . Consequently,O`T contains the CI Ca0 v ∃r.E and we are done.
Induction step. Then a is a non-leaf in AC0 . We distinguish
two cases.
C v E↑ if C v E ∈ OS
XD uD↑1 v D↑2 if OS |= D uD1 v D2
∃r.XD v D↑1 if OS |= ∃r.D v D1
XD v ∃r.D↑1 if OS |= D v ∃r.D1
F ↑ v ∃r.G if OS |= F v ∃r.G
where in the last line F is an EL concept over sig(OS)
decorated with disjunctions from Dis(OS) at leaves and G
is an EL concept over sig(OS) such that
1. F has no top-level conjunct ∃r.F ′ s.t. OS |= F ′ v G;
2. it is not the case that DisOS (F ) has at least two dis-
juncts and OS |= DisOS (F ) v ∃r.G;
3. depth(F ) ≤ depth(G) < `.
Figure 4: Optimized `-bounded EL⊥ approximation O`T .
Case 1. There is a top-level conjunct ∃r.E′ in Ca0 such thatOS |= E′ v E. Then a has an r-successor b in AC0 such that
Cb0 = E
′. Let
E = A1 u · · · uAn u ∃r1.E1 u · · · u ∃rm.Em.
Since we have already shown Lemma 15 for the case where
D0 is a concept name, we obtain O`T |= Cb0 v Ai for 1 ≤
i ≤ n. From the induction hypothesis, we further obtain
O`T |= Cb0 v ∃ri.Ei for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus O`T |= Cb0 v E
and consequently O`T |= Ca0 v ∃r.E as required.
Case 2. There is no top-level conjunct ∃r.E′ in Ca0 such thatOS |= E′ v E. Then Condition 1 from Figure 3 is satisfied
for F = Ca0 . Let A be the ditree-shaped subABox of AC0
rooted at a and let A± be the extended ABox obtained from
A|k, with k the depth of ∃r.E, by adding DisELOS (CcA)↑(c)
whenever c is a leaf in A|k. Applying Lemma 9 to A and
A± and with ∃r.E in place of ∃r.C, we obtain OS ,A± |=
∃r.E(a). Let C± be A± viewed as an EL concept decorated
with disjunctions from Dis(OS) at leaves. Since there is no
top-level conjunct ∃r.E′ in Ca0 such that OS |= E′ v E there
is no top-level conjunct ∃r.E′ in C± such thatOS |= E′ v E
either: if this was the case with ∃r.E′ corresponding to the
successor r(a, b) of a in A±, then we can apply Lemma 9 to
the subABox of A rooted at b and the subABox of A± rooted
at b to obtain OS ,A |= ∃r.E(b) and thus b in A corresponds
to a top-level conjunct ∃r.E′ in Ca0 with OS |= E′ v E.
o
G More Optimization for Figure 3
A further optimization of the approximation from Figure 3
is shown in Figure 4 where DisOS (C0) is defined just like
DisELOS (C0) except that the disjunctions and conjunctions are
based on all concepts from sub−(OS) rather than only those
formulated in EL. Compared to Figure 3, the second last
concept inclusion and Condition 2 have been added, with the
aim of invoking the expensive bottommost concept inclusion
less often.
Example 6. Consider the following variation of the ELU
ontology in Proposition 1:
OS = { A v B1 unionsqB2,
∃r.Bi v Bi, for i ∈ {1, 2}
Bi uA′ v ∃r.M for i ∈ {1, 2} }.
The approximation OωT in Figure 3 would contain the CI
A′ u ∃rn.A v ∃r.M (†)
for all n ≥ 1. However, DisOS (A′ u ∃rn.A) is
(A′ uB1 u ∃r.B1) unionsq (A′ uB2 u ∃r.B2)
and we have OS |= DisOS (A′ u ∃rn.A) v ∃r.M . Conse-
quently, the CIs (†) are not contained in the approximation
OωT according to Figure 4. It is compensated by the CIs
A v XB1unionsqB2
∃r.XB1unionsqB2 v X(B1u∃r.B1)unionsq(B2u∃r.B2)
A′ uX(B1u∃r.B1)unionsq(B2u∃r.B2) v XDisOS (A′u∃rn.A)
XDisOS (A′u∃rn.A) v ∃r.M
with the last line being an instantiation of the new second last
CI schema in Figure 4.
Proposition 2 and Example 3 provide cases where the last
line of Figure 4 is still needed. Arguably, the cases illustrated
by these examples are not too likely to occur in practice.
It should be clear that the new CIs in the second last line are
sound and thus soundness of the approximation is not compro-
mised. In what follows, we proof completeness. For our proof
to go through, we need to assume that > is always contained
in sub−(OS). We start with observing two technical lemmas,
the first one being a variant of Lemma 6.
Lemma 16. Let C0 be an EL concept over sig(OS) dec-
orated with disjunctions from Dis(OS) at leaves such that
DisOS (C0) has at least two disjuncts. Then O−T |= C↑0 v
DisOS (C0).
Proof. (sketch) The proof is almost identical to that of
Lemma 6, we only sketch the differences. The fact that C0 is
no longer an EL concept but is decorated with disjunctions
from Dis(OS) at leaves is no problem at all. It is simply car-
ried through the entire proof and does not prompt any further
modifications. The fact that we work with DisOS (C0) instead
of DisELOS (C0), however, does require some changes. In the
main proof of Lemma 6, we need a very slight modification of
the special chase plus an adapted formulation of Lemma 7.
We define a variant `′ of ` that only differs in the clause
for disjunction:
• A `′ C1 unionsqC2(a) if (a)A |= C1(a) or (b)A |= C2(a) or
(c) C1 unionsq C2(a) ∈ A.
Now, the only modification of the special chase is that, in
Rule 4, we replaceA ` D2(a) withA `′ D2(a). The adapted
formulation of Lemma 7 then reads as follows.
Claim 1. Let O be an ELU⊥ ontology and C0 be an EL con-
cept over sig(O) decorated with disjunctions from Dis(OS)
at leaves such that DisOS (C0) has at least two disjuncts. Then
XDisO(C0)(a0) ∈ chspO(AC0).
In the proof of Lemma 6, in the claim stating that O−T |=
C↑i v C↑i+1 for all i ≥ 0, we need to adapt the Case of Rule 4,
as follows.
Then there are D1(a) ∈ Ai with D1 ∈ Dis−(OS) and
D2, D3 ∈ Dis(OS) such that Ai `′ D2(a), OS |= D1 u
D2 v D3, and Ai+1 = Ai ∪ {D3(a)}. Let Ea be the sub-
concept of Ci that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in
Ai and let Fa be the subconcept of Ci+1 that corresponds to
the subtree rooted at a in Ai+1. Then Fa = Ea uD3. From
D1(a) ∈ A and D1 ∈ Dis−(OS), we obtain that XD1 is a
top-level conjunct of E↑a . From Ai `′ D2(a), we obtain an
EL concept D′2 with ∅ |= E↑a v D′2↑ and OS |= D′2 v D2;
we in fact obtainD2 by ‘following’Ai `′ D2(a) using the def-
inition of `′ and whenever we arrive at Ai `′ F1 unionsq F2(b) and
this holds because of Case (a) from the definition of `′ (resp.
Case (b)), replacing the occurrence of F1 unionsqF2 in D2 that gave
rise to this with F1 (resp. F2). From OS |= D1 uD2 v D3
and OS |= D′2 v D2, we obtain OS |= D1 uD′2 v D3 and
thus O−T contains the CI XD1 u D′2↑ v D↑3 . Consequently,
O−T |= C↑i v C↑i+1 as required.
It remains to prove Claim 1. The proof is, in turn, a slight
modification of the proof of Lemma 7. Again, we concen-
trate on sketching the differences. Of course, we replace
DisELO (C0) with DisO(C0) throughout the proof. Further, we
replace ` with `′ in property (P1) and in (the two incarnations
of) property (P3). We then go on to construct the interpretation
I as before and show, also as before, that it is a model ofO. It
remains to show that a0 /∈ DisO(C0). For this, we first need
to observe the following version of Claim 1 in the proof of
Lemma 7.
Claim 2. Let a ∈ ∆I be an individual of chspO(AC0) and
let C ∈ sub(O) (not necessarily be an EL concept). Then
a ∈ CI implies
1. ∅ |= Ea v C if a is original and disjunctive, and
2. chspO(AC0) `′ C(a) otherwise.
The proof is by induction on the structure of C. All cases
except C = C1 unionsq C2 are as in the proof of Claim 1 in the
proof of Lemma 7. Due to the use of `′ in place of `, however,
the additional case is straightforward using the semantics and
induction hypothesis.
We next argue that a0 is disjunctive. Assume to the con-
trary that it is not. It can be verified that Lemma 10 (sound-
ness of the special chase) still holds when the precondition
ch
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O(AC0) ` D(a0) is replaced with chspO(AC0) `′ D(a0).
Let K be the conjunction of all C ∈ sub−(O) such that
a0 ∈ CI . By Claim 2, chspO(AC0) `′ C(a0) for all such C.
Thus the modified Lemma 10 yields O |= C0 v K. Since
I is a model of O, this implies that DisO(C0) has only the
disjunct K, a contradiction to DisO(C0) having two disjuncts.
Now back to our proof that a0 /∈ DisO(C0). It remains to
show that a0 /∈ DisO(C0)I . Then there is a disjunct K of
DisO(C0)I such that a0 ∈ CI for every conjunct C of K.
Since a0 is disjunctive, Point 1 of Claim 1, yields ∅ |= Ea0 v
C for all conjuncts C of K. Thus ∅ |= Ea0 v DisO(C0), in
contradiction to our choice of Ea0 . o
Lemma 17. Let D ∈ Dis(OS) be satisfiable w.r.t. OS and
let C be an EL concept. Then OS |= D v ∃r.C, implies
that there is a D′ ∈ Dis(OS) with OS |= D v ∃r.D′ and
OS |= D′ v C.
Proof. For an interpretation I and d ∈ ∆I , let Con(d)
denote the conjunction K ∈ Con(OS) such that for all
C ∈ sub−(OS), d ∈ CI iff C is a conjunct of K. Now
consider all models I of OS and all d ∈ ∆I with d ∈ DI .
We use KI,d to denote the set of all K ∈ Con(OS) such that
K = Con(e) for some r-successor e of d in I. Further, we
use K to denote the set of all KI,d.
Claim. For every KI,d ∈ K, there is a K ∈ KI,d with
OS |= K v C.
Assume that this is not the case. Then for each K ∈ KI,d
take a tree model JK of OS with root eK such that ek ∈
KJK \ CJK . Then let the interpretation J be obtained from
the unraveling of I at d by dropping all subtrees rooted at r-
successors of the root d, taking the disjoint union with all JK
and making each eK an r-successor of d. It can be verified that
the resulting J is a model of OS and that d ∈ DJ \ (∃r.C)J ,
in contradiction to OS |= D v ∃r.C. This finishes the proof
of the claim.
Now let D′ be the disjunction of all K ∈ KI,d with OS |=
K v C, over all KI,d ∈ K. By the claim, OS |= D′ v C.
Moreover, by definition of K, we have OS |= D v ∃r.D′ and
are done. o
Now back to the completeness proof of the modified ap-
proximation shown in Figure 4. Due to Lemma 15, it suffices
to show that for all CIs F ↑ v ∃r.G with F and G of the form
required for the last line of Figure 4 and Property 2 from Fig-
ure 4 not satisfied, then the restriction O∗T of OωT to the first
four lines is such that O∗T |= F ↑ v ∃r.G.
Thus take a CI F ↑ v ∃r.G as described. Then
D = DisOS (F ) has more than one disjunct and OS |=
DisOS (F ) v ∃r.G. By Lemma 16, O−T |= F ↑ v XDisOS (F ).
Moreover, DisOS (F ) is satisfiable w.r.t. OS since it contains
at least two disjuncts. To show that O∗T |= F ↑ v ∃r.G, it thus
suffices to establish the following.
Claim. If OS |= D v C with D ∈ Dis−(OS) satisfiable
w.r.t. OS and C an EL concept, then O∗T |= XD v C.
We prove the claim by induction on C. If C = A is a con-
cept name, then it follows from OS |= D v C that O−T
contains a CI XD u XD v A, and thus we are done. The
case that C = C1 u C2 is straightforward using the semantics
and induction hypothesis. Thus assume that C = ∃r.C1. By
Lemma 17, there is a D′ ∈ Dis(OS) with OS |= D v ∃r.D′
and OS |= D′ v C1. We can find a disjunction D′′ with at
least two disjuncts such that OS |= D′ ≡ D′′: if D′ has only
a single disjunct that does not contain > as a conjunct, we
can choose D′′ = D′ unionsq (D′ u >) and if D′ has only a single
disjunct that does contain > as a conjunct, we can choose
D′′ = D′ unionsqD− where D− is D′ with conjunct > removed.
We can apply the induction hypothesis to D′′ and C1 to ob-
tain O∗T |= XD′′ v C1. Moreover, by the second last line
in Figure 4, O∗T contains XD v ∃r.D′′ and thus we haveO∗T |= XD v ∃r.C1, as required.
Theorem 7. Let C0, D0 be EL⊥ concepts with D0 ∈
sub(OS). Then OS |= C0 v D0 iff O−T |= C0 v D0.
Proof. The ‘if’ direction follows from Lemma 13. For
‘only if’, assume that OS |= C0 v D0. By Lemma 6,
O−T |= C0 v DisELOS (C0)↑. By definition of DisELOS (C0),OS |= C0 v D0 and D0 ∈ sub(OS) implies that every
top-level conjunct of D0 is a conjunct in every disjunct of
DisELOS (C0). First assume that there is only a single such dis-
junct. Then DisELOS (C0) with conjunct D0, and since D0 is
an EL concept it is also a conjunct of DisELOS (C0)↑. Thus
O−T |= C0 v DisELOS (C0)↑ implies O−T |= C0 v D0 as
required. Now assume that DisELOS (C0) has more than one
disjunct. Then DisELOS (C0)
↑ = XDisELOS (C0)
and O−T con-
tains the CI XDisELOS (C0)
u XDisELOS (C0) v D0. Thus again
O−T |= C0 v D0. o
H Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8. Let OS be an ALC ontology, sig(OS) = Σ.
Then
1. the ontologyOωT from Section 4 is an EL⊥ approximation
of OS w.r.t. ELQ(Σ);
2. the ontology O−T from Section 4 is a (finite) EL⊥ approx-
imation of OS w.r.t. AQ;
3. if OS falls within ELU , then the ontology OωT from Sec-
tion 3 is an EL approximation of OS w.r.t. ELQ(Σ).
Proof. Define the unfolding A∗a of an ABox A at an in-
dividual names a as the (possibly infinite) ABox whose
individuals are words w of the form a0r1a1 . . . an with
a0 = a and ri+1(ai, ai+1) ∈ A for all i < n, and con-
taining the assertions A(a0r1a1 . . . an) if A(an) ∈ A and
r(a0r1a1 . . . an, a0r1 . . . anrn+1an+1) if rn+1(an, an+1) ∈
A. The following has been proved in [Lutz and Wolter, 2010].
Fact 1. The following conditions are equivalent for any EL⊥
ontology O and EL concept C:
1. O,A |= C(a);
2. O,A∗a |= C(a).
We now show the first claim of Theorem 8. The proofs of
the remaining two claims are similar and omitted. Let OS
be an ALC ontology with sig(OS) = Σ and let OωT be the
ontology from Section 4. To show that OωT is an EL⊥ approx-
imation of OS w.r.t. ELQ(Σ), we have to check the condi-
tions of Definition 3. For Condition 1, assume that C(x) is
in ELQ(Σ) and that A is an ABox using no symbols from
sig(OωT ) \ sig(OS) such that OωT ,A |= C(a). By Fact 1,OωT ,A∗a |= C(a). Denote by (A∗a)|Σ the ABox obtained fromA∗a by removing all assertions using symbols not in Σ. Then
still OωT , (A∗a)|Σ |= C(a) as OωT and C do not use any of the
symbols used in the assertions we removed. By compactness
there exists an EL concept D corresponding to a finite sub-
ABox A1 of (A∗a)|Σ with root a such that OωT |= D v C.
Then OS |= D v C since OωT is an EL⊥ approximation ofOS and C,D use symbols in Σ only. Then OS ,A |= C(a)
since there is a homomorphism from A1 to A mapping a to a.
For Condition 2, let C(x) be in ELQ(Σ) and Q =
(O,Σ′, C(x)) such that (OS ,Σ′, C(x)) ⊇ Q, where Σ′ is
a signature with Σ′ ∩ sig(OωT ) ⊆ sig(OS) and O is anEL⊥ ontology. To show that (OωT ,Σ′, C(x)) ⊇ Q, con-
sider a Σ′ ABox A such that O,A |= C(a). Then by
Fact 1, O,A∗a |= C(a). Hence OS ,A∗a |= C(a) since
(OS ,Σ′, C(x)) ⊇ Q. Then one can argue as above that
OωT ,A∗a |= C(a). Hence, by Fact 1, OωT ,A |= C(a), as
required. o
